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The rise in the use of cloud computing has also been accompanied
by increasing numbers of online security incidents and concern about
the overall security of cloud services. Current threat modelling methods,
one of the most common ways of identifying threats to systems, are not
able to provide a useful remedy to this. The manual threat modelling
techniques require experts and can take too long, and the automatic tools
are aimed primarily at software developers and do not apply to systems.
This thesis presents the underlying theory for Cloud-COVER (Controls
and Orderings for Vulnerabilities and ExposuRes), a threat modelling tool
developed to identify threats to cloud computing systems. Cloud-COVER
models the system under observation, and determines the priority of
threats by using a system of relative preferences provided by the tool user.
Cloud-COVER also looks at how threats from individual parts of the sys-
tem present a danger to other parts of the deployment, identifying ways
in which beachhead based attacks can be prevented. Cloud-COVER’s
model is abstracted in such a way that it is extensible, allowing users to
shift the model’s perspective to suit their own circumstances.
This work presents a number of major and minor contributions to
security and threat modelling. The main contributions of this thesis are
an alternative way of ranking threats by using relative preferences, and an
extensible model which analyses the way threats can propagate through
systems by looking at the permissions given to connections between
instances.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Security
Computer security relies on anticipating threats to systems, and taking
measures to respond to them. In security, defenders are always reacting
to attackers, with every new attack requiring a quick response to prevent
knowledge of the method spreading before defences against it have been
developed. In addition, systems are getting ever more complex over time,
requiring more detailed knowledge of how to protect against all threats.
The last few years have seen attacks reach the biggest scale yet, with
the data of millions of people being hacked from organisations such as
OPM [3] and Adobe [4]. Some security experts believe that the balance
in computer security has shifted in favour of the attacker, with defenders
now playing catch up [5].1
The increasing popularity of cloud computing has also raised concerns
about the security of the hosted machines (also known as instances) and
data. The virtual machine instances in the cloud are hosted outside of
a user’s material premises, possibly on the same physical machine as
a competitor, and could even be in a country considered to be hostile.
There are many possible problems with virtual machine security, such
as issues with maintaining the security of increasingly large numbers of
instances [6]. Also, some attacks previously only thought to be theoretical,
such as attackers identifying specific target virtual machines within
data centres and attacking them, have actually been demonstrated to be
1Bruce Schneier is of the opinion that at the current moment in time, the offensive
capabilities available to attackers give them much more advantage than the defensive
capabilities available to anyone guarding a system, but that over time this balance can be
changed.
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effective [7]. This gives rise to widespread concern about cloud security,
which according to some sources is the primary worry preventing more
businesses and users migrating to the cloud [8]. Chow et al describe
one of the fundamental issues arising from cloud’s unique delivery
model as coming from the problem of outsourcing computation without
outsourcing control of the hosted data [9].
There are many concerns about cloud services, although many of the
concerns are actually older threats manifesting in new clothes due to
the unique delivery model of cloud services. Many of the problems
encountered in the cloud have actually been known about for some time.
Virtualisation, the mechanism by which physical machines can share their
resources among several virtual machines, was originally developed by
IBM to enable multiple users to effectively access their (few) mainframe
machines in the 1960s [10]. Most of the associated security problems
with hypervisors therefore have also been known about for the same
period. The notion of computing as a utility (something cloud computing
is frequently described as) also originates in the 1960s, when it was
proposed as the future of computing by John McCarthy [11].
Despite many of cloud computing’s security problems having been
encountered since then, there are in fact some aspects, such as issues
arising from the mix of locations of user, host, and provider, that do
present new problems [12].2 Threats can also be considered from the
perspective of the many hardware and network layers, not all of which are
under the control of the cloud customer [13]. This includes governance
issues such as compliance, which covers problems such as data location
or the quality of service being provided by the cloud service [14]. Using
digital forensic techniques to investigate successful attacks can also be
problematic due to ownership and location issues of data on cloud
services, such as network logs which are not routinely available to cloud
2A user may be based in one country, the physical machine and data may be in a
second country, and the company providing the service may be based in a third country.
There are many problems which can come from this model, with legal issues being a
prominently used example.
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customers [15].
In a distributed system, such as those in the cloud, the way that the
machines in a deployment connect to each other may have implications
for security requirements. The many options available to configure the
internal workings and external connections of multiple machines makes
understanding their security needs quite challenging, and getting increas-
ingly complex as the size of the deployment gets larger. In addition,
making even small changes to any individual system could have a signif-
icant impact on previously developed security defences. This could be
for an individual instance, or for whole deployments, with the effects of
any changes causing a domino effect through the network connections to
the entire system.
Computer security is not just a matter of solving technical problems
but a combination of people, process, and technology (also referred to as
’the triangle’) [16].3 Good security planning needs to incorporate from
each of those in order to create good defences for any system.
Risk management is one of the important processes used to assess
and improve security. As part of the risk management process, risk
assessments are commonly used to try to manage threats to systems,
and commonly utilise threat modelling, a specific type of modelling
developed to help to understand threats to computer systems [17]. Many
of the terms presented here are based on those presented in the ISO27000
series, and can also be seen in the Glossary presented at the back of the
thesis [18].
3People refers to human strengths and weaknesses. Although people may know to
keep their passwords secret, they may write them down in easily accessible locations,
endangering security. Security education is therefore a way to improve the ’people’ aspect
of security. Process refers to procedural expectations which maintain overall security.
For example, regular password updates are part of a good security process. Finally
technology refers to any kind of engineering, whether software or hardware, which is
used to protect systems. For example, this can be a firewall (software), or a fingerprint
lock on a laptop (hardware).
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1.2 Modelling
Models are a useful way of abstracting away and simulating the compo-
nents and concepts within systems. By representing only those things
which are needed in order to fulfil a given purpose, models can be used
to analyse complex problems. The modelling of systems can be used to
better understand the ways in which systems work and how they can be
improved. By continual redevelopment and refinement, adding useful
things and taking away less useful ones, models can be adapted and
simplified to aid in understanding problems in relation to improving real
life systems.
The mathematician George Box famously observed that, "essentially,
all models are wrong, but some are useful" [19]. This observation il-
lustrates the problem with modelling anything, which is that much of
the detail needs to be abstracted away, leaving only enough detail in
order to answer the question being posed. To this end, when developing
models one of the most important things to think about is the amount of
information included. Too much information risks creating a muddied
pool, with useful information difficult to extract amongst all the data. Too
little information can mean not enough useful analysis, leaving model
developers to carefully consider the level of balance they require. The
other thing to consider is the recipient audience, which will also influence
this balance. For experts more information is needed to answer their
questions, whilst novices obviously need simpler answers.
Security is not just about the need to protect an asset from threats. It is
also about balancing the need to prevent access to unauthorised parties
with the needs of the owner and permitted parties to access the asset [20].
It is this balance which is important to get right in any consideration of
security. Finding the right balance involves trying to understand how
different choices can end up affecting this balance. In computers, installed
software may contain vulnerabilities allowing attackers to successfully
breach the system, but they might be absolutely necessary to perform
certain functions. Creating multiple user accounts and extending them
4
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permissions may allow an unprecedented level of access to a protected
resource, but it may be necessary in order to get a job finished. There are
many considerations for the owner of a resource to think about.
When applying the same thought process to distributed systems, these
questions can become more complex to answer. Which instances should
be allowed to connect to each other? What kind of precautions need to be
taken to protect against specific threats? With any more than a handful
of instances, such questions could easily overwhelm anybody.
It is clear that modelling can be used to aid in the process of under-
standing how to make such decisions. In fact, modelling has been used
to look at computer systems, or components within systems, in order to
understand and improve their design and performances. It can also be
used to identify threats, and to take measures to protect against those
threats.
1.3 Threat Modelling Background
Risk management has been commonly used as one of the main ways
in which to manage the security of systems, and threat modelling has
become one way to help to achieve this. Threat modelling is used to
identify threats, users can then try to fix the vulnerabilities and then, if
that is not possible, to look for protections which do not allow for those
vulnerabilities to be exploited. Threat modelling is a specific type of
modelling, which involves making a model of a system or components of
a system, and using this model to understand how attackers could take
advantage of the architecture of that system in order to attack it.
Threat modelling originally developed as a manual process, looking at
identifying threats to systems. The fact that no single way of modelling
could identify all threats to a system meant that different models emerged.
Microsoft developed the STRIDE [21] and DREAD [22] threat modelling
approaches, both of which are manual methods. However, manual
analysis needs to be performed by security experts and can prove costly,
especially due to the constant need for re-evaluation in most development
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processes. The development of more than one approach was partly due
to the fact that some of the categories in STRIDE occasionaly overlap.4
Later on the STRIDE process was incorporated in Microsoft’s SDL threat
modelling tool, helping to make parts of the process automatic [24]. This
tool concentrates primarily on application development and is aimed at
developers, and is of little use to system administrators. On Information
Security Exchange, Adam Shostack (one of the primary developers on
the SDL Threat modelling tool) is one of the most frequent commenters
on the topic of threat modelling, and confirms this to be the case [25].5
Although systems administrators need to think about security just as
much as developers do, they need to take care of systems composed of
many computers, running many different programs. Developers need
only think about the single piece of software they are working on, and
need not concern themselves with the code and security issues of other
software. Therefore, systems administrators need alternative tools to
support their own needs with regards to systems security.
Threat modelling is not just limited to using these tools or processes.
Data flow diagrams are frequently used, as they are a useful way of think-
ing about how data moves through systems [26]. Threat modelling can
also involve using penetration testing to find places to attack, involving
applications such as Firesheep or Wireshark [27] [28]. In addition to this,
attack trees can be used by considering attacks as tree structures with
goals as the root and the different ways of reaching the root as branches
[29]. By attaching different values to the branches reaching the goals,
each path can be evaluated to consider how to prioritise defence within
systems. They can help to consider any situation when given values for
each branch for the situation under consideration. Sea Monster is an
automated example of a tool used for attack trees [30]. Also, SeaSponge
4Larry Osterman notes on his Microsoft threat modelling blog that many threats between
the classes Elevation of Privilege and Tampering of Data overlap, as well as some from
the other classes. [23]
5Studying security encourages paranoia: the user identifying as Adam Shostak may be
someone else masquerading as him. There is no proof either way, other than his display
of knowledge of the subject in his many postings is consistent with him being genuine.
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is a recently developed threat modelling tool targeting systems adminis-
trators [31]. However, despite the development of these processes and
tools their adoption has been mixed, with their popularity not becoming
widespread and many people choosing not to make use of them [32].
It is a mistake to limit the scope of threat modelling frameworks and
tools to application developers alone. Systems themselves are also in
need of protection from threats, and could make use of threat modelling.
Regular systems do not currently benefit from threat modelling tools, a
glaring omission. In the more complex scenario of distributed systems,
there are currently no candidates. Yurcik et al observe the fact that the
security of distributed systems are frequently managed with an attitude
in which they are treated no differently than a single standalone system
[33]. In addition, even some of the original developers of the STRIDE and
DREAD threat modelling processes concede that the lack of academic
rigour applied to them has been an issue [34].6 In fact, most threat
modelling tools and frameworks have been developed outside of any
academic process. This provides us with the required motivation to look
at research on the development of methodologies which can aid the threat
modelling process for cloud computing. There is a clear need to develop
such processes and theories, in order to increase the popularity of threat
modelling to a wider range of users.
1.4 The Threat Modelling Process
A threat modelling process is the act of threat modelling. The goal of a
threat modelling process is to produce a threat model. The threat model
contains a list of threats to users of that system, so that they may take
action against them.
There is no single definition of what threat modelling is [35]. It is
generally considered to be a process of identifying threats to a system
6Although David LeBlanc does say that the lack of academic rigour is an issue, he also
says that sometimes very useful things don’t need to pass through the ’ivory towers of
academia’ to be useful
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(or components of a system) by modelling the system in question, and
in taking precautions to guard against the threats. Threat modelling is
usually asset-centric, attacker-centric or software-centric, which allows
for different ways to understand how the system being modelled can be
attacked [36].
In the same way, there are no agreed list of steps which constitute
a threat modelling process. However the general stages in which the
process is carried out tend to retain common features wherever they are
discussed. These involve the following:
1. Modelling the system and including components, connections, trust
boundaries, and assets which need to be protected.
2. Analysing the model in a structured way to identify the way in
which threats to the system exist and ways in which attacks could
take place.
3. Finding protections against the attacks and implementing them.
4. Although optional, a good threat modelling process is never fin-
ished and should be repeated at regular intervals. This is because
additional threats could have developed in the meantime. Addi-
tionally, considering the system from a different perspective, or
even using a different threat modelling process, can also be used
to identify additional threats to the ones identified in the original
process.
Threat modelling can be approached differently. For example, although
the probabilities of threats are considered in many methodologies, some-
times a threat modelling framework may state that it is not something
which they consider [37].
1.5 Threat Propagation
Threat propagation is a big security problem for networked systems. It
is very common to find that infiltrations to networked systems are often
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achieved through an initial point of compromise (commonly referred to
as a "beachhead"), after which the attackers find additional targets on
the same network [38]. These instances which could be used as useful
beachheads need to be identified, in order to prevent attackers using
them as stepping stones to attack other better protected parts of the
deployment.
For example, in a deployment with 2 instances (A and B) where in-
stance B has much more valuable data, instance B is likely to receive
much higher levels of protection. However, the fact that instance A (re-
ceiving much lower levels of protection) connects to instance B (and is
trusted by it) means that an attacker could also use instance A to connect
to, and attack instance B. Therefore the threat to the data on B, also has
to considered to be a threat to the data on B from A as well. The threat
can be said to have propagated. This is referred to in this work as threat
propagation.
1.6 This Thesis
This thesis presents the work of the development of the underlying
theories for a well engineered threat modelling tool for cloud computing.
As a demonstration of its sound engineering, additional work is also
presented on its extensibility, allowing users to shift perspective to their
own circumstances.
1.6.1 Contributions
The contributions of this thesis are based around the underlying the-
ory for Cloud-COVER (Controls and Orderings for Vulnerabilities and
ExposuRes), a threat modelling tool for cloud computing [39]. The
contributions are listed below, with the major contributions mentioned.
• Cloud-COVER makes a major contribution to security in the way it
allows users to rate impact from attacks to their system, by using
relative preferences between data security attributes (and the threats
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which they represent to the system). This is in contrast to other
methods which use numerical valuations.
• Cloud-COVER’s major contribution to threat modelling is the way
in which the analysis of threat propagation takes place. By looking
at the connection permissions and their ability to violate specific
security attributes, Cloud-COVER is able to identify which threats
need to be protected against from other instances.
• Cloud-COVER allows users to change the perspective of the model
to match their preferences. By allowing users to input any of three
of the inputs which are used to determine threat propagation, users
are able to adapt the analysis to one which considers issues which
the default version of Cloud-COVER does not look at. This allows
users to think about threats in different ways, an important part of
a good threat modelling process.
• Cloud-COVER is the first threat modelling tool taking the perspec-
tive of a system owner, other available threat modelling processes
and tools are aimed primarily at application developers or involve
using manual methods.
1.6.2 Structure
The details of each of the chapters are included below.
• Chapter 2 introduces the underlying model for Cloud-COVER, a
threat modelling tool for cloud computing. Cloud-COVER presents
users with a prioritised list of threats to cloud deployments that
they need to defend against. This chapter covers the the model
representing the deployment, along with the user valuation system,
which allows users to specify impact to their system by using
relative preferences.
• Chapter 3 extends the analysis of Cloud-COVER, by discussing the
feature of threat propagation, and how this is analysed in order to
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produce the results presented to the user. The way in which the
final results are ordered is also discussed.
• Chapter 4 covers the extensibility of Cloud-COVER, and how users
are able to change the perspective of the tool to cover the issues
relevant to their own specific circumstances.
• Chapter 5 presents a case study of users with different levels of se-
curity knowledge, their use of Cloud-COVER, and how this demon-
strates the fulfilment of the original aims behind the development
of Cloud-COVER.
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2.1 Introduction
The security of a system depends on many factors, related to every part
of a system. This may include the operating systems, the application
software, user permissions, and the networks connections, to name only
a few. The way a system, its instances and connections may be configured
is likely to make it, and therefore its security considerations, unique.
Given so many factors and the complexity of trying to understand their
implications, it can be extremely difficult for even the most knowledge-
able security expert to determine how to approach defending any system.
Threat modelling tools are one way in to help in identifying threats to
systems. However, existing threat modelling tools are aimed mainly
at application developers, and there is a need for ones which consider
threats from the perspective of system owners and administrators.
Another major issue with threat modelling tools is the concentration
on direct threats instead of indirect ones. Indirect threats are those which
do not involve direct attacks on deployments, examples can include if
attackers find where cloud services back up their data and access confi-
dential data that way. This would mean someone could find their data
compromised despite taking all necessary precautions to have protected
their deployment, and the deployment never getting hacked. Users need
to be made aware of threats like these. Other examples of this kind of
threat are location based issues, where companies need to know that
their data is kept within particular legal jurisdictions. As these kinds of
threats come from cloud computing’s delivery model, they are newer and
have had less attention paid to them. They may be less well known and
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therefore more in need of being presented to users in any threat analysis
of cloud systems.
The other issue with threat modelling approaches and tools is their
reliance on using numeric values to rank identified threats. The problem
with using such values is that of being able to represent information about
security numerically. This can be a problem, as different kinds of people
may value things differently. For example, Dana Epp observes how
during a threat modelling process developers (who are rarely security
minded) tend to give low values to threats (usually a 1 or 0 out of 10),
whilst security minded individuals rate almost all threats as a 10 [40].1
This is a problem for the usefulness of any rankings produced by such
methods. Cloud-COVER uses an alternative approach involving relative
preferences between security attributes provided by the user, allowing
rankings to be inferred from the provided preferences.
This chapter presents the underlying model of Cloud-COVER, a cloud
security threat modelling tool. Cloud-COVER works by taking an input
from the user and analysing the input model to order the identified
threats. The input model takes in information about the cloud deploy-
ment, and information from the user about the priority of security at-
tributes for their data. Using the provided information, Cloud-COVER
models the deployment, and presents the user with a ranking of the most
pressing threats in their deployment alongside countermeasures to these
threats.
Cloud-COVER has the following selling points which set it apart from
other threat modelling tools:
• Cloud-COVER considers threats to entire systems, not just low
level details relevant to software and software developers, and is
1Bruce Schneier frequently comments on this kind of problem in information security
as well as real life security, calling it CYA (Cover Your Ass) Security. The principle is
that for anybody whose job involves responsibility for any kind of security, there is an
unwillingness to allow people to think that they do not take all threats seriously. The
result is that almost all threats are treated as a priority, as this ensures that they cannot
be blamed in the event that something goes wrong. However, there is an obvious cost of
wasting resources with such an approach [41].
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intended to be more accessible to a wider variety of computer users
(not just security experts).
• Cloud-COVER takes in user valuations as relative preferences be-
tween security attributes, not just as numerical valuations. This
helps users to more effectively prioritise threats to their systems.
• Cloud-COVER considers the way in which threats propagate through
systems, helping to make users better able to understand how to
prevent attackers using less well protected instances to attack better
defended ones.
• Cloud-COVER considers indirect threats as well as direct attacker
threats to security.
• Cloud-COVER categorises threats into instance threats, and organ-
isational threats, an important distinction which allows users to
better understand the way in which threats need to be defended
against to secure entire deployments.
This chapter is structured in the following way: first a discussion
of the model used by Cloud-COVER to simulate cloud deployments
is in Section 2.2, followed by a categorisation of threats in Section 2.3.
The security attribute values for determining the rankings of the results
are discussed in Section 2.4, related work is in Section 2.5, followed
by possible further work in Section 2.6 and a discussion of the chapter
follows in Section 2.7.
2.2 Model Requirements
The identification of the threats to a given deployment requires a number
of factors. To start with, it requires a model capable of matching the
deployment under analysis to the threats and exposures capable of
causing damage to it. Prioritising those threats that do exist requires some
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knowledge of their likelihood, and an understanding of the potential
impact that they might have on the deployment.
Cloud-COVER is not intended to look at low-level details, and does not
need to ask about information such as how data interacts with and flows
through processes and threads. Although these are useful to identify
how attacks may be successful at lower levels, it is important for Cloud-
COVER to distinguish itself by identifying those threats at a higher level,
which are just as important.
The main output of the tool should be a list of threats to the system.
Details of these threats should include the instance they represent a threat
to, and their priority. This information can be determined based on user
input. The major steps to identify these threats and then order them
according to priority is explained below, along with justifications for the
choices made.
2.2.1 Stages
Before detailing the input to the system, an overview of the way in which
the tool works may be helpful. Here a quick discussion of the major
stages of Cloud-COVER’s work is provided.
1. Stage 1: The user enters details of the deployment, which includes
information about instances, data on the instances, and the connec-
tions linking the instances together.
2. Stage 2: The user enters their preferences regarding the relative
valuations between the security attributes of all of their data.
3. Stage 3: Cloud-COVER analyses the provided deployment, and
looks at the interaction between the connection permissions and the
security attribute/permission table to see whether threats exist on
the various instances, and where those threats may originate from.
4. Stage 4: The threats are ordered based on the user supplied prefer-
ences between data security attributes.
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5. Stage 5: The results are presented to the user.
2.2.2 Input
Cloud-COVER models cloud systems by considering instances, the con-
nections between them, and the data present on those instances. A UML
figure defining how instances connect to each other and host data is in
Figure 2.1. Instances are considered as nodes in a directed graph, with the
connections as directed edges between them, such as the simple example
presented in Figure 2.2. The data are represented as properties of those
nodes. In Cloud-COVER’s model the data itself is considered as the asset
of a system, and ultimately the object of an attacker’s target, whether to
read, modify, destroy, or deny/delay access to it. Cloud-COVER therefore
uses an asset-centric threat modelling perspective.
0..* Instance
0..*
Data
1..*
Connection
Figure 2.1: A UML diagram showing instances, data and connections.
Instances can connect to 0 or more instances, but must contain
at least 1 data item.
When entering information about the deployment, users are asked
about the properties of the given item being entered. Instances, con-
nections, and data all have properties which determine whether certain
kinds of attacks or exposures are possible. Examples of attacks which
depend on such properties are exploits which use SQL injection. These
need data to be SQL data in order to work, without which the attacks are
pointless.
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B1 B2A1
Data Instance Connection
Key:
A B
Figure 2.2: A simple cloud deployment and its required information,
with instances, hosted data, and connections.
One of the main problems with user input in Cloud-COVER is in
creating a balanced tool which is able to provide users with a list of
system wide threats without expecting too much security expertise from
them. Asking users questions with too much detail can risk making
a threat modelling tool too difficult for non security experts, and also
risk being too time consuming to use. Asking too little can risk only
identifying obvious threats. The fact that Cloud-COVER is aimed at
finding threats at a higher perspective is helpful, as it means that less
information is required in order to provide an analysis.
Instances
In Cloud-COVER’s model, instances are any cloud services hosting data
(whether public or private cloud, or SaaS, PaaS or IaaS), and are linked by
connections. Instances can host multiple data items, and can be connected
to any number of other instances.
Users are asked about the properties of instances, in order to determine
what possible threats exist against them. These properties can be whether
they host specific types of software, whether they are updated regularly,
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or any other actions which could mean that certain threats might exist.
Data
Data represents any data users host on their instances. Attackers can be
a threat to different kinds of data depending on both the properties of
that data, and on the security attributes of that data. Users enter this
information to allow Cloud-COVER to determine the existence of those
threats.
The security attributes of the data are discussed in more detail in Sec-
tion 2.4, and determine which classes of threat are relevant to that particular
data security attribute. This means that only threats which impact on
a specific security attribute, such as integrity, will be retrieved at that
point, and the threats related to other security attributes are retrieved
depending on their order of valuation by the user. The properties of data
determine whether specific threats from within those classes of threats
exist against the data in question.
Connections
Connections represent any connection between processes from one in-
stance to another instance. Any more than a single process is represented
in a single connection, with all the permissions contained within.
Connections are obvious targets for attackers. One of the most impor-
tant issues to determine is the kind of connection used. When connections
are not encrypted, there are obvious security concerns to address. The
connections link instances to each other, producing a directed graph of
instances as nodes and connections as edges, which is used at the analysis
stage.
Cloud-COVER looks at how threats to instances also need to be pro-
tected against from other instances, so the role connections play is very
important within the model. To this end, users are asked to input which
permissions are granted to connections to perform. Permissions are spe-
cific actions which the connecting processes are permitted to carry out at
19
2 Cloud-COVER
the connected-to instance. The justifications of the analysed permissions
are given in Chapter 3. Given these permissions, the analysis is able to
understand what the implications are for how threats propagate across
the deployment.
2.2.3 Impact
The same attack on two identical deployments could impact the two
owners of those deployments in completely different ways, based on
what the concerns of the deployment owners are with regards to their
data. Whilst one owner may be concerned about possible data leakages
violating confidentiality, another owner may only be concerned with the
availability of their data and nothing else. The term ’impact’ may itself
be interpreted differently by people. The impacts of data breaches are
often understood in economic terms, but even this can be understood
differently by people. For example, this can include the lost opportunity
cost of an attack, the cost to rebuild a deployment, and the possible
compensation due to affected customers. It can also be difficult to assess
non-economic interpretations — for example, there is no easy answer to
how reputational loss could be measured.
Instead of trying to assess the impact of any attack on Cloud-COVER
users in a uniform way, the users themselves are allowed to determine the
potential impact to their deployment. This limits the kinds of problems
which could be created by asking for information from users about things
which they might interpret differently. By asking users to provide details
about the importance of the security attributes of confidentiality, integrity,
availability, and compliance to their data, Cloud-COVER is better able to
understand how to prioritise the threats to their deployments, and make
the analysis more relevant and adaptable to their individual circumstance.
The method used for valuation of impact is described in more detail in
Section 2.4.
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2.2.4 Likelihood
Not all threats are equally likely to occur. When presented with two
threats of equal ability to impact a system, the most important one to
defend against is the one which is more likely to happen. Of course, it is
impossible to predict for certain what the likelihood of a future event will
be. However, there are ways in which we can use analysis of previously
successful attacks to predict how likely certain kinds of attacks are to
take place in the future. For example, methods for evaluating likelihood
of threats are described in ISO 27005 [18], and in OWASP’s Risk Rating
Methodology [42].
Although victims of attacks are not keen to publicise their breaches,
statistics on breaches are available. For example, there a number of inter-
net security firms who investigate system breaches around the world, and
compile annual reports detailing the statistics of these attacks. Trustwave
[43], Cisco [44], Symantec [45] and Wensense [46] are a few of these.
These statistics, which are used to help to prioritise the final threats
presented to the user, are analysed in more depth in Chapter 3.
2.3 Threats and Exposures
A threat is a potential violation of security. Vulnerabilities are needed in
order for attackers to exploit and thus realise those threats. The existence
of many of these vulnerabilities is often due to the presence or absence
of certain software or data on the system. In order to learn about the
presence of these properties of the system, Cloud-COVER gives users the
opportunity to input this information. Using this supplied information,
Cloud-COVER is able to determine whether attackers would be able to
take advantage of these vulnerabilities. When presented with a list of
those threats, users can then be directed towards countermeasures to
guard against them.
In Cloud-COVER, some threats may be realised through similar at-
tacks, but are considered separately because the defences needed to
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guard against them are different. Examples of this are threats from an
unauthorised user executing code, or viewing data. Although both could
be defended against using user permissions, the unauthorised user view-
ing data could also be prevented by encrypting the data. This means that
it makes sense to keep these as separate threats, since the defences may
vary.
2.3.1 Exposures
Not all of the threats faced by users on the cloud are from direct attacks
against deployments. Other major issues can occur due to logistical
reasons, such as issues concerning data location and compliance require-
ments. Data from industries where the confidentiality of information is
considered top priority (examples include the defence and health indus-
tries), are frequently covered by laws or regulations governing where
they are allowed to be stored. Cloud services may be owned by compa-
nies in one jurisdiction, the operations and staff located within another,
and the services provided to users in locations anywhere in the world.
Other issues come from cloud service policies, which users may not have
given much thought to. For example, users may assume that data they
have deleted no longer exists, but an attacker may be able to access a
backed up copy based elsewhere. In this way, their data can be accessed
indirectly from their deployment. The fact that these details are usually
abstracted away means that they may not be clear to the user. This is
the kind of threat to cloud computing deployments, different from those
from more traditional (ie non cloud) systems, which are important to
highlight in Cloud-COVER — and which are not covered by other tools.
Cloud-COVER considers this class of issues, which are termed ‘exposures’
alongside those which are direct attacks on the deployment.
2.3.2 Propagating Threats
It is important to determine whether threats contained within the model
are able to propagate to other instances. Not all threats are able to prop-
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agate across connections. Those which are not able to do so, obviously
do not need to be considered when analysing threat propagation. Only
some types of attack remain workable when performed using trusted
connections. For example, Cross Site Scripting (XSS) attacks work by
attacking machines which are browsing the internet, but are not made
any more effective from inside the network of a targeted instance. The
nature of XSS attacks is to inject code to a website server, and wait for
vulnerable machines to browse that website. They are not considered
worthwhile as targeted attacks, so are not the kind of threat that would
be considered to work as a propagating threat.
Each threat identified in the threat modelling stage is reviewed to
see whether it makes sense for an attacker to be able to utilise it from
other instances within the same deployment as well as from outside the
network. If it is, then it can be added to the list of threats for which
this is possible. When the results are being presented, any propagated
threat values will only affect the placement of threats which are able to
be propagated. Those that cannot propagate can remain in their original
places.
2.3.3 Organisational Threats
The threats and exposures are split into two categories. Some of them
are relevant only to particular instances, and the approach to their coun-
termeasures needs to be implemented individually for those services.
Other threats are relevant to the entire deployment or organisation as
a whole, as they require a coordinated approach. For example, one of
the major problems for a deployment is of not knowing where a cloud
provider may base its service, which may be a problem for compliance
purposes. Although the problem of data location can be handled on an
instance by instance basis, the best preparation is a coordinated approach,
involving an understanding of where all potential providers locate their
services. Doing this instance by instance would be a much longer, and
more ineffective process. This will allow the development of a policy
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for how data location will be handled on all instances, and avoids the
kinds of issues created by using an ad hoc approach for each instance. By
highlighting threats in this way, Cloud-COVER can be seen to therefore
place attention towards the idea of protecting deployments by looking at
the trio of people, process and technology and not concentrating solely
on technology issues.
Even more importantly, there are threats which are able to compromise
entire deployments when responses are not considered from a deploy-
ment wide perspective, such as those from malware or poor password
practice. Poor password practice (such as reusing passwords for multiple
instances) can compromise an entire deployment if an attacker gains
access to a cloud administrator’s management account. Malware, by com-
promising a single instance, is able to perform a wide variety of attacks
on hosted data, including retrieval of passwords. A single coordinated
approach to managing these kinds of problems is absolutely necessary
to maintain good security practice, and by being better advised against
these threats users may be able to better protect their deployments. In
contrast only using good security practice on a single instance, and not on
others, can put data on that well protected instance at risk even if nothing
connects to it, since the user’s management portal may be compromised
by the poor security practice on the other instances.
The other important difference with organisational threats is that the
problem of threat propagation (covered in the next chapter) does not
apply. Although some types of organisational threat do propagate, the
need to consider each instantiation of such a threat as a threat to the
whole deployment means that there is no need to think of them as threats
to individual instances, but rather to the whole deployment. This means
that they do not need to be covered by any analysis of propagation. The
organisational threats therefore need to be presented to users separately
from the instance threats. There is no direct way of comparing the two,
and mixing the two categories when presenting results could end in
some confusion for the users. By keeping them separate, users can
understand that there are two distinct types of threats, with different
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needs for approaching their defences.
2.3.4 Security attributes
The security attributes of confidentiality, integrity, and availability are
part of a security model often referred to as the ‘CIA’ triad, with the
acronym referring to the initial of each security attribute [47]. This model
influences this work and other work in the area, by allowing threats to
be categorised according to the data security attribute that they endanger.
Not all kinds of attacks will impact the owners of data. For example,
a data owner may be concerned with ensuring that their data remains
available at all times (availability), that it does not change without the
required permissions (integrity), but not with keeping their data private
(confidentiality). By acknowledging that threats can be categorised in
this way, data owners can better prioritise the threats to their systems.
In addition Cloud-COVER considers threats relevant to compliance, an
important attribute of security for cloud systems which are not covered
by the CIA trio. Compliance is an area which is relevant to cloud systems,
particularly due to the remote nature of their services. Concerns about
data have manifested in laws and requirements (national, international,
and/or regulatory) safeguarding data. Examples of this include regu-
lations about the location of data, or who is allowed access to data —
such as the UK Data Protection Act [48], which many cloud users may be
ignorant of. Other kinds of concerns are related to specific processes for
data which are required to be followed. In the USA the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 includes laws about retention of evidence (and therefore
data) about financial transactions [49]. The kinds of threats which apply
to compliance therefore are not applicable to any of the three from the
CIA triad, and are categorised using this separate attribute. In Cloud-
COVER’s default mode, compliance is considered to include threats to
data location (keeping data within the boundaries of a jurisdiction) and
threats to auditability (of knowing about important actions which are
performed on data).
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Each threat and exposure is only relevant to some of these security
attributes. Denial of service attacks for example, are able to violate the
availability of data, and also their compliance (since their auditability
can be violated) and not their confidentiality, integrity. Others may
be relevant to more than one, and some may even be relevant to all.
Depending on the security attributes users choose to value as the highest
priority, the threats relevant to those security attributes will be ordered
according to the priorities given. So when a user rates availability of a
particular piece of data as being the most important security attribute,
the threats to availability are prioritised when they are presented with
the results. This is discussed further in Section 2.4.
2.4 Impact Valuation
The need to allow users to determine the possible impact that different
kinds of attacks could have on their deployment was discussed in Sec-
tion 2.2.3. However even allowing users to determine this for themselves
allows problems of ambiguity and misunderstandings to occur. Will
Harwood’s work on using alternatives to numeric valuations (discussed
in Section 2.5) is one way to try to value impact. An overview of the
advantages and disadvantages of absolute and relative valuations for
security threats can provide some useful insight.
2.4.1 Absolute values
Advantages
• Absolute values make sense to people as they are used to rate
things in everyday life.
• Absolute values are used in other threat modelling processes, and
people are used to using them in this way.
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Disadvantages
• Absolute values can have some ambiguity related to scale, such as
whether scores double that of other ratings represent a doubling of
the importance, or not.
• People are reluctant to value any kind of threats as having low val-
ues as this suggests that those threats are not being taken seriously.
Anyone with a job involving security will be unwilling to suggest
that they are not taking all threats seriously.
• Absolute values only allow for a maximum number of levels of
importance. For example, when ranking out of a score of 10, items
can only be valued on those 10 levels. For larger sets this may prove
problematic, as there may be clear need to prioritise between more
than 10 items.
2.4.2 Relative values
Advantages
• Relative values can be more suited to security as users do not have
to specifically give low (or high) values.
• Users can give zero, one or multiple rankings to one item. This
means that in cases where any two items may appear to be equally
ranked by preference, users can add in an additional value between
them in order to distinguish that one is preferred to the other. With
numeric valuations, if two items are both given the same rankings,
the only choice would be to change the value, which may move the
newly valued items into the same level as other non-equal items,
repeating the problem.
• Systems with a need to prioritise large numbers of items are not
limited to the number of levels of the rating system, as absolute
values are. Theoretically, such a method would be able to provide
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as many levels of preference as can be identified from the user’s
valuations.
Disadvantages
• Relative values can be difficult to apply to final rankings, as they
carry no inherent meaning apart from the words they have been
labelled with. Users might infer their own understandings of the
meanings given to them.
• Relative values can take more time to input, if users choose to
provide more than one valuation for multiple items.
2.4.3 Cloud-COVER’s valuations
From this comparison, it makes sense to choose the relative valuations,
specifically due to the issues of users being unwilling to provide low
ratings to security threats, and the issue of ratings being limited to the
value of the highest score. Relative valuations do not have those problems,
which are important to consider when ranking security threats. For this
reason, Cloud-COVER uses relative values for its ranking system.
As all threats are linked to at least one security security attribute, the
use of user priority between those security attributes is a good way of
determining the orderings of those threats. By comparing the relative im-
portance between two security attributes, a more objective valuation can
be determined. Users therefore have a choice of providing a preference
for the importance between the confidentiality, integrity, availability, and
compliance of each data item. This means that security attributes of the
same data, or those of different data, can be compared to each other to
determine their relative importances for the user. This provides Cloud-
COVER with a reference point from which to determine the importance
of threats and exposures with regard to the user’s preferences.
Given two security attributes, A and B, users are provided with the
option of defining two kinds of relationships between them: A’s impor-
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tance is greater than B; or A’s importance is much greater than B. Figure 2.3
provides an example of impact valuation between the security attributes
of a single piece of data and its four security attributes, with an example
of resulting threats retrieved in the order produced in Table 2.1. Figure 2.4
has an example where a user chooses to include more than one valuation
for some security attributes, in order to ensure that there is less ambiguity.
A1’s integrity is rated as more important than A1’s compliance, whereas
in Figure 2.3 both security attributes were considered to be rated equally
as important by the user. A user can choose not to include a security
attribute if the threats to that attribute are of no concern to them. In
Figure 2.5, a user chooses not to provide a valuation for A.cn, as they feel
that the confidentiality of the data is not worthy of their attention.
A1:in A1.cp
A1:av
A1.cn
Much more important than
More important than
Attribute of A1
Attribute labels:
cn: confidentiality
av:  availability
in:   integrity
cp: compliance
A1.x
Key:
Figure 2.3: Each input datum has four security attributes which can be
prioritised by the user: confidentiality, integrity, availability,
and compliance. The user provides a valuation between those
security attributes. Availability receives their highest rating.
Using these two relationships, and by defining at least one relationship
for each data security attribute the user wishes to include, a graph
is produced of the relationships and their importances relative to one
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A1:in
A1.cp
A1:av
A1.cn
Much more important than
More important than
Attribute of A1
Attribute labels:
cn: confidentiality
av:  availability
in:   integrity
cp: compliance
A1.x
Key:
Figure 2.4: In Figure 2.3, integrity and compliance are considered equal.
A user can add more valuations to reduce any such ambiguity,
which they do here. A1.in is now more important than A1.cp.
another. Subsequently the importances of all security attributes relative
to each other can be inferred by their position in this graph. In Figure 2.6
a simplified example is presented, using only two security attributes
(confidentiality and availability) from three data items, representing a
total of six security attributes in the preference graph (integrity and
compliance would also be used in a complete example). In this example,
the availability attribute of datum D1 is specified as being the most
important item (D1.av), with the confidentiality of D1 being the least
important (D1.cn). These preferences can then be used in the analysis
stage.
After the user’s input, the valuations are looked at to see whether
any relationships need to be re-evaluated to produce a second graph.
This analysis is done in order to adjust paths which may need to be
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A1:in
A1.cp
A1:av
Much more important than
More important than
Attribute of A1
Attribute labels:
cn: confidentiality
av:  availability
in:   integrity
cp: compliance
A1.x
Key:
Figure 2.5: An example of a user not rating one of the data security at-
tributes. In this example, the user does not rate confidentiality,
since it is not a concern for them.
reconsidered in view of the user’s preferences. In Figure 2.6, the user
specifies their preferences, in which there is only one relationship of a
security attribute much more important than another (A1.cn→ D1.cn).
Whilst originally B1.cn→ D1.cn is defined by the user as being a greater
than relationship, its placement suggests that it needs to be evaluated
again. If B1.cn is more important than A1.av and A1.cn, then it must also
be much more important than D1.cn, in the same way that A1.cn (which
B1.cn is rated as more important than) is. The relationship is redefined
accordingly, which can be seen in its changed weighting afterwards.
Depending on their positions in the graph relative to other security
attributes, it is possible for two security attributes to have an equal value
to each other but this is only possible when they do not have a user
defined preference between them. In Figure 2.6 the position of B1.av
and B1.cn show that since they are both considered to have the same
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Order Data Sec. Attribute
1 A1 Availability
2 A1 Confidentiality
3 A1 Compliance
= A1 Integrity
Table 2.1: Threats from Figure 2.3 are retrieved in this order.
D1:av
B1:cn
D1:cn
B1:av
A1:av
A1:cn
B1:cn
D1:cn
B1:av
A1:av
A1:cn
D1:av
Before longest 
path analysis
After longest 
path analysis
Much more important than
More important than
Attribute of A1
Attribute labels:
cn: confidentiality
av:  availability
in:   integrity
cp: compliance
A1.x
Key:
Figure 2.6: Before and after longest path analysis. Before shows a user’s
preferences. After shows how longest path analysis can alter
the weightings of some edges (in this case, B1.cn → D1.cn
changes).
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relationship with A1.av with no other defined preferences between them,
that they are both at the same level of importance to each other. The next
change to the graph is made when considering threat propagation, which
is discussed in detail in Chapter 3.
2.5 Related Work
The Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) is a risk assessment
methodology which uses metrics to quantify the threat posed by vulnera-
bilities to a system. These metrics look at the effect of the CIA triad on the
severity of the impact of the vulnerability in question (in a similar way to
Cloud-COVER), the environment in which it operates, and any mitigating
factors [50]. Cloud-COVER considers compliance in addition to the CIA
attributes, and uses user supplied comparisons about the importance of
those valuations to determine the priority of threats, removing some of
the ambiguity of using numeric values.
Trike is a threat modelling framework and tool which considers threats
from the perspective of risk management [51]. Trike’s consideration of
threats involves more formality than other frameworks, asking about
the interaction of actors, assets and intended actions. By relating the
actors with these intended actions (for example, adding a blog entry), and
considering these with regards to a number of keywords (for example,
the keyword ’no’ would suggest the actor is not a permitted actor), threats
to the system are determined. Trike therefore involves a large amount
of detail, but produces results for those patient enough to make use
of it. Trike also considers threats from a different perspective to other
approaches, in that all threats are categorised as being either denial of
service or elevation of privilege. Cloud-COVER uses a higher perspective,
and allows users to input their own attributes for modelling purposes if
it fits their view of the threat modelling process.
STRIDE is a threat modelling process which works by modelling sys-
tems at low levels. Threats are determined by considering whether certain
components could take advantage of a number of possibilities (Spoofing,
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Tampering, Repudiation, Information disclosure, Denial of service, and
Elevation of privilege). There are times when the threats from different
classes can overlap (for example, spoofing and tampering will frequently
overlap threats). STRIDE’s biggest problem is the fact that it is a manual
method. For this reason, Microsoft developed the SDL Threat Modelling
Tool which utilised the STRIDE approach.
The Microsoft SDL Threat Modelling Tool uses a simple interface for
users to enter details about their system at a low level of detail, which
generates reports detailing possible threats to the system [24]. The tool
is aimed primarily at developers, and identifies threats at low levels.
Cloud-COVER considers organisational threats which are not covered by
many threat modelling tools, and does so from a higher level perspective.
SeaSponge is a browser based threat modelling tool aimed at system
administrators to help them identify threats to their systems [31]. Sea-
Sponge works by allowing a graphical input of sections of a user’s system,
including data flow, and identifying the threats faced by the input system.
Cloud-COVER is aimed at distributed systems, and divides threats into
the categories of instance threats and organisational threats, and also
considers the way in which threats propagate.
Cloud-COVER provides a coverage of higher level threats than any
of the other work presented here. Additionally, all of these methods
require the user to have some security knowlege in order to make use of
them. By allowing more inexperienced users to perform threat modelling,
Cloud-COVER providers a coverage of a greater number of users, espe-
cially those who are unlikely to have used threat modelling techniques
beforehand.
Will Harwood uses alternatives to numeric values as a way of defining
ratings in a trust system [52]. He uses labels assigned to those relation-
ships (for example, the labels of trust and distrust), in order to reason
about the paths linking two individuals in a web of trust. This provides a
way of evaluating the relationship between any two nodes within the web
of trust by referring to the provided labelled valuations. Cloud-COVER
uses this approach and applies it to a ranking system in which users
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provide their preferences for the priority of data security attributes.
2.6 Further Work
One of the most pressing concerns with the design of Cloud-COVER was
the desire to create a more accessible level of threat modelling tool, which
could be employed by a wider range of users. One of the primary ways
this was achieved was by mainly asking questions about the deployment
instances and their connections. There is the possibility of asking users
to provide more details about their system, and this could help to aid
the threat modelling process. However asking users for details like this
could change the expectations of the user, and it could take longer. It
would be important to understand the way in which this could impact
the usability of the tool.
One other area which could be very useful to include in Cloud-
COVER’s model would be to consider data owners, and system users.
With cloud computing allowing for organisations to share data in complex
architectures, a way of modelling the interactions of users, data owners
and permitted users along with connections could aid the administrators
in identifying where threats in such systems could exist.
2.7 Discussion
This chapter has presented alternative ways of identifying threats and
prioritising their importance for threat modelling purposes.
A novel way of rating the impact of threats to systems was introduced,
in which users are able to provide relative valuations between data
security attributes. This method has a number of advantages over the
use of numerical valuations, not least the fact that users are not forced to
provide any inherent priorities through high or low numbers. By splitting
up threats into those which are relevant to four security attributes, and
allowing users to prioritise those security attributes according to their
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own priorities, Cloud-COVER is better able to suggest the most pressing
threats to the deployments under consideration.
In addition, the viewpoint of the model is different to most other threat
modelling processes. Cloud-COVER’s model does not look at low level
details such as threads or processes and instead considers instances,
data, connections and their properties. By considering the perspective
of systems Cloud-COVER is better able to identify threats which system
owners and administrators might be responsible for.
Important distinctions are also made between different kinds of threats,
so that users can be provided with better knowledge of the types of
threats which exist, and the need for different kinds of responses to them.
An important example of this is the differentiation of instance threats
and organisational threats. The fact that instance threats may only exist
on a single instance at any one time, and that organisational threats
always exist against all instances in a deployment (and that they require a
coordinated approach to defend against), is important for users to know
about.
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3.1 Introduction
Any analysis of threats to a cloud computing deployment cannot be
considered complete without an understanding of the way in which
threats propagate throughout the system. Deployments with more than
a single instance contain multiple attack points, making it important to
think about how disparities in the levels of security between instances
could prove detrimental to overall security. Attackers who find their
targeted instance too hard to breach may find that they can reach their
intended target by going through other less well protected instances
which connect to (and has permissions to make changes to) their original
target.
This issue is what is referred to here as threat propagation. Threat
propagation depends on the permissions granted to the connections
between the instances. Other threats could exist when attackers breach a
deployment through poorly protected instances, and only then find that
they are able to reach even better protected instances, subsequently using
those connections to perform an even more destructive attack than they
had originally planned. It is crucial therefore to understand the impact of
the ways in which instances connect to each other, and what this means
for threats and defending against them.
In a simplification of reality, if a system’s security can only be con-
sidered to be as strong as its weakest link, then all instances within a
cloud deployment would need to be as well defended as each other. This
however does not consider the more complicated nature of the cloud, as
users may only have limited control over some of their instances (such as
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Software-as-a-Service), they may not allow those connections to have any
meaningful permissions to violate security, or may not even consider cer-
tain instances to host anything valuable (and therefore not worth wasting
resources to protect). Each of these are issues to be considered for any
kind of threat propagation analysis. This chapter looks at how Cloud-
COVER’s model treats threat propagation, by looking at the connections
and their permissions, and determining whether they would be able to
help an attacker violate data security attributes over the connections.
This chapter is structured in the following way: threat propagation is
discussed in Section 3.2, with user valuations discussed in Section 3.3,
and the impact of connection permissions covered in Section 3.4. Data
operations and their relevance to permissions are covered in Section 3.5,
and the actual method of valuation propagation is presented in Section 3.6.
The ordering of final results in presented in Section 3.7, related work is
in Section 3.8, further work is in Section 3.9 and finally a discussion in
Section 3.10.
3.2 Threat Propagation
It is important to define and justify what threat propagation means within
the context of Cloud-COVER, before covering how threat propagation is
modelled within the tool.
In order to determine the level of impact different threats could have to
a deployment, Cloud-COVER uses the security attribute valuations from
users to find the threats relevant to those prioritised security attributes,
and to order the threats accordingly. The fact that attackers are known
to use less well protected instances (beachheads) to breach deployments
means that it is vital to identify any potential instances which could play
such a role. To protect against them requires an understanding of the
way that threats propagate from one part of the system to another.
It is tempting to think that threats propagate in a way such that they
appear to be transitive. Let us take an example scenario in which 3
instances, A, B and C, are connected. Threats to C also need to be
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protected against from instance B. In addition, threats to B also need to
be protected against from instance A. Should it not therefore mean that
threats to C need to be protected against from instance A? Not so long
ago, when security practice did not have access to the number of tools
and processes available today, this may have been an acceptable way to
approach the situation. However times have changed, and attackers at
present need to do a lot more work in order to move through connections
(assuming that good security practice is being used). Also given that
everyone has limited resources, it is unreasonable to aim to protect all
instances at an equal level.
Use of good security practice, such as intrusion detection systems,
means that attacks can often be identified before they are able to spread
from their initial foothold. This helps administrators take action to lock
down those instances before attackers have the opportunity to continue
their actions, and prevent them from moving at will through deployments.
In Cloud-COVER, one of the important ways in which security controls
are represented are the connection permissions, and they allow the
modelling of the threats of attackers when individual instances of a
deployment are breached. They also demonstrate how and why some
threats are unable to simply propagate across all connections that they
come across. They will only be able to propagate across some connections,
depending on what security attribute they are a threat to, and what
permissions the connections have. They therefore require some analysis
in order to understand where this could happen.
If the assumption about threats simply propagating across instances
C to B to A held up then the simple way to protect against threats to
those instances would be to value all threats to a certain security attribute
(or even all security attributes) as being at the same level across all
connected instances. Actually, there is some value in this approach, and
it is already included in Cloud-COVER when considering organisational
threats. In the previous chapter, we described how threats were split
up into those threats to instances as well as threats to deployments
(organisational threats). The fact is that organisational threats which
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require a coordinated approach are those which are given the same value
across all systems. For the threats which require instance by instance
approach, it is unreasonable to expect users to prioritise all instances
the same, and makes much more sense to identify specifically those
instances with data security attributes of higher value, and the instances
from which that data might be attacked. This allows users to dedicate
their sparse resources more effectively, instead of looking to protect all
instances at the highest possible level.
A more effective way to protect assets would be to protect data on
an instance, and then protect that same data from being attacked from
any connections representing a threat, instead of protecting the data and all
connecting instances with the same priority. The actual way in which
Cloud-COVER treats threats is seen in Figure 3.1, with Table 3.1 providing
an understanding of how the threats can be prioritised. In this figure,
C1’s availability is valued as the most important, so these threats are
considered first in priority. Then, equally as important, are threats to the
same data, coming from B to C. Instead of protecting the whole instance
of B from that threat, which seems to be a waste of resources if it the
hosted data is not valued as highly, only the threats to C1’s availability are
protected against. Then, next most important are threats to confidentiality
to C1 on C, and equally as important, from B to C1. The figure and table
show how breaking down threat propagation in this way should lead
to a better understanding of how resources should be allocated when
assessing security.
One of Cloud-COVER’s important roles therefore is to provide advice
to prevent an attacker from being able to mount a successful beachhead
attack. Cloud-COVER does this by identifying important connections
that attackers could use for breaches, and advising users to protect such
connections from those particular threats. This makes a much more
effective security approach than other approaches which disregard the
crucial role of beachheads in distributed systems.
Finally, it is important to provide users with a tool which does not just
present them with a list of threats but which allows them to understand
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Figure 3.1: A simple example of threats propagating. There is no transi-
tive propagation. Threats to data on C need to be protected
against from instance C, and from threats on instance B.
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Priority Threat Instance Data
1 Threats to availability C C1
= Threats to availability C from B C1
3 Threats to confidentiality C C1
= Threats to confidentiality C from B C1
5 Threats to availability B B1
= Threats to availability A A1
Table 3.1: The values propagate from instance to instance, and require
data to be protected against from incoming connections. The
priority of the threats is based on the values in Figure 3.1.
the implications of the choices they make. If the only thing which changed
was the presence or absence of threats, and not the priority they were
presented in, then users would be much less likely to value making good
security choices for important issues like the connections coming in and
out of their instances. By allowing the configuration of the deployment
to demonstrate the implications for systems security, users can learn the
importance of good security practice.
3.3 Valuations
The user’s security attribute valuations represent the priority that they
attach to the security of the associated data. As other instances are likely
to connect to and possibly have permissions to perform operations on
that data, one cannot only consider threats from the instance on which
that data resides. As the valuations provided are used to prioritise threats
in the presented threat rankings, they can be used as the way in which
threat propagation is analysed as well.
When analysing the cloud model input by the user, the analysis will
need to take place in two stages. Firstly, the analysis looks at all instances.
Since threats can only propagate when connections between instances
exist, the analysis then goes through each of the outgoing connections.
Then the analysis looks at the two instances in question (the connect-
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ing instance, and the connected-to instance), and looks at the security
attribute valuations for data on each instance, and checks to see whether
the correct conditions for propagations are satisfied. These conditions
are described in Section 3.6.
However, not all connections are equal, and sometimes certain connec-
tions can mean that those values do not propagate. Network connections
can be configured with permissions, which can be one way of creating
more secure links. The granted permissions can limit users and pro-
cesses at both ends of the connection, and therefore affect the way in
which attackers might make use of those connections. This will mean
that although some threats could propagate to all instances over their
connections, others might not be able to propagate at all — this will all
depend on the properties of the instances and connections.
3.4 Connection Permissions
Connection permissions are specific actions that any processes within
an instance are permitted to perform on other connected-to instances.
Depending on the permissions granted to the connections, only certain
kinds of security attributes can be violated. For example, confidentiality
cannot be broken by the destruction of data, since the destruction will
mean that it is impossible for anyone to have violated confidentiality
by seeing the data in question. For the other permissions, it is easy
enough to think of examples of ways that confidentiality can be violated.
When moving data, or requesting the forwarding of data, it is possible
for the data to be passed to a user or instance who does not have the
right to view that data. The creation of data may require the need to
simultaneously maintain its confidentiality (eg with access control). The
way other security attributes are all considered individually with their
own combinations with security permissions is discussed in Section 3.5.
Using this analysis, the only time security attribute valuations are
propagated is when those permissions are granted on the connections
under analysis. It is therefore vital to consider how within a cloud
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deployment permissions might affect security, and for Cloud-COVER to
be able to provide such information to its users. By understanding the
implications of granted permissions to each of the data security attributes,
the analysis can produce a set of results which mean that only those
threats which can pose a threats to a deployment are contained in the
threat results presented to the users.
3.5 Operations
Within the model, an important question is how to represent the con-
nection permissions. One example of permissions is that of regular
access control, in which the controlled permissions are whether to allow
users the ability to command read, write, or execute operations on a
file. Although this is one way in which it could be considered, there is a
difficulty involved in thinking about the permission to execute (since it
could include further operations to read and write from within the file
being executed). Therefore Cloud-COVER instead uses an alternative
method. However, other perspectives (such as ones where alternative
permissions are used) may be explored by using the extensibility feature
on Cloud-COVER’s inputs. These are discussed further in Chapter 4.
The fundamental operations present in all computing systems are the
creation, destruction, comparison, and movement of data. Although the
modification of data can also be considered as another operation, it can
be done in two different ways. Modification can be a combination of the
destruction of data followed by the creation of new data, or it can be
when the old data is retained but moved to a new location. This means
that modification does not strictly need to be considered. The destruction
of data is an obvious possibility of a threat to data. Data movement is also
a threat when it is moved without permission of the owner. Data creation
can create problems if not created with a security process in mind (such
as access control). Another important operation, the comparison of data,
can be used in security for evaluating between two values, but is not an
operation which is capable of creating new security threats. As a result,
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it is not included among the permissions used in the model. The other
three operations (creation, destruction, and movement) are all capable of
creating new threats in a system when not managed correctly.
Data operations can be linked with the security attributes already
contained within the model. For example, the destruction of data is of
clear relevance to the compliance attribute, since the command could be
used to destroy auditability data. The fact that these links could provide
another level of depth to the analysis (covered in more depth below),
meant that the identified operations were chosen to be the permissions
included in the model.
The permissions granted to these types of operations can then be
used to analyse the permissions given to connections. From this point
on, we shall refer to the granting of these operations as permissions,
unless specifically discussing issues related to the individual operations
themselves. Therefore, permissions can be considered to be conditions
which describe whether specific types of operations are allowed to be
performed. The fact that each of the permissions may not allow security
attributes to be violated requires a justification of how these conditions
will be included within the model’s analysis tool. In Table 3.2, the
permissions which allow for certain security attributes to be violated over
connections is presented. The permissions themselves are also discussed
further.
The permissions and security attributes used in Cloud-COVER are
those which are found to present a useful balance between detail and
ease of input. It is easy enough to ask users to input more information
about their permissions, and possible to use those for more detailed
analysis, but there would be a price to pay for doing this. Resulting
problems would include usability issues for users (most importantly, the
amount of time to enter such information), especially those with less
security experience. There is an argument to be made for including more
detail, and it is easy enough to think of more permissions or security
attributes (CIA is only one of a number of security models). If users are
concerned enough about including other permissions this is an option
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that is available to them through Cloud-COVER’s extensibility feature
(explored in Chapter 4).
Sec. Attribute Threat Reason
Data Creation
Confidentiality Yes Newly created confidential data re-
quires immediate access control
Integrity Yes Newly created data may require in-
tegrity check at later date
Availability Yes Newly created data can impact
availability
Compliance Yes Newly created data may be subject
to compliance procedures (such as
auditability)
Data Destruction
Confidentiality No Destroyed data cannot be accessed
to violate its confidentiality
Integrity Yes Destroyed data cannot be verified
for integrity
Availability Yes Destroyed data cannot be accessed
Compliance Yes Destroyed data could be compli-
ance data (such as auditability data)
Data Movement
Confidentiality Yes Movement of data may allow non-
permitted users to access data
Integrity No Moving data cannot affect integrity
(as long as original data is retained)
Availability No Moving data cannot affect availabil-
ity (as long as original data is re-
tained)
Compliance Yes Movement of data may be subject
to compliance requirements
Table 3.2: Table describing combination of permissions, security attributes
and threats. Threat column asks whether security attribute
valuation propagates on a connection only featuring that per-
mission. For example, confidentiality is not affected by data
destruction, so the answer is no.
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3.5.1 Creation
The creation of data across a network can be a problem in cases where
the data requires specific properties upon creation. Newly created data
frequently requires permissions to be created or integrity checks. De-
pending on the kind of instruction received through the connection, any
of the data security attributes could be violated by attackers. Newly
created cata can also impact availability.
Newly created data is also required in many organisations to undergo
a compliance process where it needs to auditable. This would mean that
it would need to be created in such a way that means that the system
can keep track of what is performed on it. Creating new data, even
on a secure instance, therefore means that the machine where these
instructions can be sent from needs to be kept secure.
3.5.2 Destruction
Data destruction is a clear way to create problems in a system. Availability
is the obvious security attribute which will be affected by data destruction,
given that it depends upon the data in question existing.
Destruction can also be a problem for compliance purposes, since au-
ditability requires that the metadata holding information on the auditing
of data needs to be retained. Destruction of auditing data could therefore
be violation of this requirement.
3.5.3 Movement
The movement of data on an individual machine is a copy operation from
one data location to another data location on the same machine. In dis-
tributed systems, the move instruction needs to be split into two different
instructions. Firstly, a machine can move its own data to another location
on itself. Secondly, a machine can send a command to another machine
to forward its data to another second machine. Therefore, someone who
has tried and failed to capture data present on a target machine may
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accomplish the same goal if they learn that another less secure instance
has the right to send a forward command, and subsequently use this
command to forward all the information from their original target to
themselves.
There is an important note to make here. A read command from
instance A to instance B can be considered to be the same thing as
a forward command, and both are represented as movement. This is
because if instance A is breached, and this command is sent to instance
B, it violates exactly the same security attributes as if the data had been
forwarded to another third location owned by the attacker.
3.6 Valuation Propagation
There are three specific conditions which must be fulfilled in order for a
security attribute’s value to be propagated.
1. The two instances hosting the data security attributes in question
must be connected.
2. The security attribute on the connected-to instance must be rated
as more important by the user.
3. The permission for the security attribute in question to propagate
over that connection must satisfy those described in Table 3.2.
This is done as an iterative process, by going through each instance
and value of the data security attributes on each. After these conditions
have been satisfied, the value of the more highly rated security attribute
is passed over. These propagations continue until each of the connections
has been exhausted, ensuring that no more propagations can occur.
An example of threat propagation not occurring due to violation of
the first and second conditions is in Figure 3.2. Figure 3.3 is an example
showing some threat propagation happening, and other propagations
not happening due to non-fulfilment of the three conditions. An example
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Figure 3.2: Values only propagate backwards on connections. Here, none
of the values propagate as the connections mean that either
their values are not higher than data on instances connecting
to theirs (the second of the three conditions explained in
Section 3.6), or their instances do not connect to instances
whose data they are valued higher than (the first condition).
For example, instances C and D are both connected to by
instance B, but the values of data on C and D are lower than
B, so no propagations can occur.
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Figure 3.3: B1’s values can only propagate to A1, so there is also a threat
to B1.av from A. This value is represented next to B1.av, as
B1.av from A. C1’s values, although higher than A1’s values,
cannot propagate to instance A, since instance A connects
only to B (the first of the three conditions for propagation
explained in Section 3.6).
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Figure 3.4: None of the values propagate, because the connection permis-
sions mean those security attributes cannot be affected. This
is the third of the three conditions explained in Section 3.6.
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of threat propagation not happening due to the third condition not
being satisfied is given in Figure 3.4. In this example, there are two
security attribute types, availability and confidentiality. The availability
attributes are linked by the connection between instance A and B, with
the connection only granted the ability to create data. Although B1.av
has a larger value than A1.av, the connection means that availability
attributes cannot propagate their value. To do so, the connection would
require the permission to destroy. Likewise, C1.cn cannot propagate its
value to instance A, because confidentiality requires the connection to
create or move data, which it does not have.
An example of these values being propagated can be seen in Figure 3.5
and Figure 3.6. Assuming all permissions are granted on the connections,
we can see that values can only propagate from C and B to A, or from
A to D. Values from B and C cannot propagate to each other, or to D. In
Figure 3.5 the availability attribute of C1 is higher than that of A1, so this
value propagates to A, as C1.av f romA. A1.av position remains the same.
C1’s confidentiality however, is lower than A1.cn, so no propagation
needs to take place. In Figure 3.6, A1.cn is checked against another of the
connected-to security attribute valuations, B1.cn. Since B is connected to
from A, and B1’s valuation is higher, the value propagates over. Since D’s
security attributes are the highest valued, its values could only propagate
to incoming instances. Since there are none, its values do not propagate
to any others.
3.7 Ordering
After the propagation analysis, the user’s threat prioritisation does not
need any further analysis. Instead, the remaining work is the ordering of
the threats relevant to each of those security attributes.
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Figure 3.5: Part 1 of an example step by step propagation. Here threats
to C1.av propagate to instance A.
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Figure 3.6: Part 2 of an example step by step propagation. Here threats
to B1.cn and B1.av propagate to instance A.
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3.7.1 Probability
There is no way to know for certain the techniques an attacker may
use to attempt a breach. Two attackers may use completely different
techniques to attack identical deployments, using their strengths as at-
tackers to choose their tactics, rather than the weaknesses of their targets.
Deployments may also have multiple points to attack, and it will not
be possible to anticipate which one will have the higher likelihood of
being targeted. There is even the possibility that a coordinated attack
could target several points at once. Exploits of previously unknown
vulnerabilities (often called ‘zero-day attacks’) can also not be anticipated,
and can cause massive disruption.1 The fact that some vulnerabilities
are immediately disclosed, whilst some are kept secret, only adds to the
problems facing system owners.
Victims of data breaches are not particularly keen on publicising attacks.
This may be due to damage to their reputation, poor security practice, or
any number of other reasons. This leaves knowledge of these breaches
hard to come by. The problem is that ideally, data about these breaches
are exactly what is needed in order to understand how to better defend
against them. Knowledge of previously successful attacks can provide
help in determining the most vulnerable and targeted parts of systems.
Despite the lack of data on this topic, there are some resources which
are able to help shed some light on the topic of successful attacks. The
statistics from these resources are useful to understand the general pattern
attacks have taken in the past few years. For example, the internet
security firm Trustwave, who investigate system breaches around the
world, compile annual reports detailing the statistics of these attacks [43].
Some statistics from these reports can be seen in Figure 3.7.
These statistics show a general trend in which a large number of attacks
1Although the very first victims of zero-day-attacks have no chance of protecting
themselves, most people can still attempt to defend their systems from these attacks in
the period following their discovery (technically they may no longer be zero-day-attacks
at this point, but the threat will still exist) by using good security practice and updating
vulnerable software.
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2014 Breach Statistics
Weak passwords / 
remote access
Unknown
File upload flaw
Insecure/unpatch
ed software
SQL injection
2013 Breach Statistics
Weak passwords / 
remote access
SQL injection
Unknown
Remote file in-
clusion
Other
Authorization flaw
2012 Breach Statistics
Weak passwords / 
remote access
Unknown
SQL injection
Remote file in-
clusion
Authorization flaw
Other
Figure 3.7: Trustwave statistics on security breaches for 2012 - 2014.
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take similar approaches. Over several years, the same attacks tend to
feature prominently (in particular poor passwords, SQL injection, and
vulnerable off the shelf software), with other attacks also regularly show-
ing up. Despite the huge number of vulnerabilities which exist, the fact
that these attack techniques stay in use demonstrates their usefulness and
prevalence. This suggests that attackers tend to concentrate on proven
techniques instead of looking for new methods of attacks. Although
statistics of the past do not assure us of the pattern of future attacks, they
suggest that the likelihood is that most attackers will try to make use of a
limited number of well proven attacking techniques that they are familiar
with, similar to those used in the recent past.
One interesting thing to note from the statistics is the number of attacks
classified as ’unknown’. This is worrying, but also suggests a need for a
tool like Cloud-COVER. By advising its users on security defences, which
can include intrusion detection mechanisms, and logging and auditing
systems, users can be better prepared to investigate security breaches.
Although it could be possible that the attacks could not be identified
using those precautions, it would seem likely that they could help to
identify at least some of the unknown attack techniques.
Although some of the threats in the cloud come from direct attacks on
deployments, there are also many that do not. As discussed in Chapter 2,
some problems come from exposures which also need to be protected
against. However, finding statistics about the prevalence of these issues
is much more difficult. Instead of relying on statistics to understand the
likelihood of these threats, the analysis of cloud security experts has been
used, such as literature from ENISA [53].
Using these resources, the threat categories are split into three classes,
those with high, medium and low probabilities of occurring. Those
threats which are repeatedly seen most often are categorised as high,
with the less popular ones categorised as medium probability. Those
categorised as low probability are rarely seen but are still known to exist.
For this reason, very few threats are categorised as low probability. These
probabilities are then used, along with the valuations provided by the
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user, to order the results. The probabilities are ultimately decided upon
not by any reference to a single source but on a combination of expertise
derived from the kinds of sources mentioned. Although this approach is
open to criticism, there is no obvious solution which can take away from
the fact that no resource has enough data from which to answer such
questions with total certainty.
One criticism which could be made of using probabilities in this way
is to differentiate between opportunistic and motivated attackers. Whilst
opportunistic attackers will simply use any openings they find through
analysis of their target, motivated attackers will use a variety of tech-
niques following an assessment of their target. By concentrating on
informing Cloud-COVER users of the areas attackers are most likely to
target, those techniques which happen to be most likely to be used by
any attackers can be identified and defended against. Although attackers
will carry on only as long as their motivation lasts, defenders need to
allocate enough resources to ensure their defences last at least that long.
The presentation of the threats to the deployment in the order of a user’s
priority can be a good way for them to determine the best way to balance
their resources for this purpose. By considering their own threshold for
what they would be prepared to accept from an attack, the results can
help them better decide whether they need to devote more resources to
security.
3.7.2 Final Ordering
After the valuation propagation has been completed, the final stage is
the ordering of the threats. The likelihood of the various threats and
exposures are not all equal. Even if an availability security attribute is
valued as most important, the different kinds of threats to availability
are not all worthy of being given the same amount of attention. Clearly,
the most important ones to pay attention to are those which are more
likely than the others. The classified probabilities are used as a basis
from which to order the threats for the final results.
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Given three threats with the probability classifications of high, medium
and low respectively, there is an obvious need to pay attention to the
threats in order of their likelihood. The main question to answer is how to
order threats when many security attributes are valued closely in priority
by the user.
Cloud-COVER’s approach
Cloud-COVER includes two different preference valuations for users to
make between security attributes. This allows the ordering of the results
to be made according to different preferences. It is important to note
that the way in which the results are affected by the valuations could be
changed if it was found to be much more useful. For Cloud-COVER, the
threat results are ordered in the following way.
Separating threats only according to user security attribute valuation
is not ideal. This is precisely because of what the probabilities suggest.
Given two security attribute valuations for a datum A, confidentiality
and availability, if confidentiality is valued to be higher than availability,
there is a difficulty in suggesting that all of the confidentiality threats
should be valued higher than the availability threats. Since there are
likely to be some threats to confidentiality which are low probability, and
some threats to availability which are high probability, there needs to be
a way to re-order the threats to take this into account.
The approach taken here is to order the values differently based on
their relationships to other security attributes. The threats from a security
attribute much more important than another security attribute are all
ranked above the lesser valued security attribute. The threats between
two security attributes, A and B, where A is only more important than B,
are a bit more complicated. A’s high probability threats are all ranked
above B’s threats. But A’s medium ranked threats are ranked at the same
level as B’s high probability threats. Instead of ranking them differently,
it makes sense to present them at the same level of priority and let
the user prioritise between them (and present them with other useful
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information at the same time, such as the probability of each of those
threats, something useful the user might wish to consider when deciding
between them). If the user had wanted all A’s threats to be ranked above
B, they could have chosen to rank A as much more important than B. The
rankings continue to be ranked in the same way with the lower ranked
threats, through the remaining threats and security attributes.
Examples of these can be seen in Table 3.3 and Table 3.4, which show an
example before and after ranking of results. Q’s confidentiality security
attribute, which is ranked as much less important than the others, are all
ranked below the other threats. The other threats are all mixed in with
each other, but ultimately depend on the preferences between them, and
their probabilities. Also Table 3.5 is an example of organisational threats,
which are presented to the user separately from the instance threats.
Repeating Threats Removal
Many threats are categorised as belonging to more than one security
attribute. A threat may violate integrity as well as confidentiality, or
a combination of any of the other security attributes. A list of threats
retrieved for the security attributes on each instance means that the
threats retrieved for the next security attribute might contain repeating
information. Even if the threat is to a different security attribute, the
countermeasures to those threats are exactly the same, which would
mean suggesting a user repeat each action unnecessarily. These threats
are removed so that the same threat is not repeated for each instance. This
allows users to have a more manageable list of threats when presented
with their results.
3.8 Related Work
Feng et al develop a Security Risk Analysis Model (SRAM) to identify
the causal relationships among the components of distributed systems,
in order to find the paths most likely to result in risk [54]. The presented
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Bayesian network uses Ant Colony Optimisation (ANO) to analyse the
graphs of the networks under observation. Using databases and proba-
bilities determined from historical observations and domain experts, a
security risk treatment plan is developed which identifies the most press-
ing paths of vulnerabilities which need to be defended. The evaluation is
performed according to security ratings applied to given properties of the
system (examples include data secrecy and data integrity policies being
rated as high, medium or low). The interactions of these ratings deter-
mine the final results. Cloud-COVER concentrates on higher level views
of the system, and considers a user’s valuation of security attributes to
determine the most pressing security priorities to systems.
Butler creates a structured approach to risk analysis called Security
Attribute Evaluation Method (SAEM), an approach in which risks are
analysed by quantifying threats based on several important indicators
[55]. This includes the likelihood of the outcomes, potential hours lost
to risk and potential revenue lost, following which SAEM considers
the cost benefit analysis of taking care of each risk. SAEM assumes an
initial security evaluation has taken place, requiring the knowledge of
some security expertise in order to provide many of the required values.
Cloud-COVER only assumes knowledge of system set up, and allows
users to rate the potential impact that different threat categories could
have on their deployment.
Kondakci creates a causal model between assets and threats, in order to
analyse the logical relations between them [56]. Bayesian Belief Networks
are used to analyse the dependencies, causalities, and risk propagation
within the network. This analysis produces quantitative risk values which
can then be used to determine where defences within a network should be
prioritised. However, this model too requires previous evaluation of the
network in order to identify assets, threats, the causal links between them,
and likelihoods of risks. Cloud-COVER does not need any input of threat
likelihood, as it contains such information in its default inputs. Cloud-
COVER also consider causes of threats to be connection permissions, as
it uses a higher level perspective.
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3.9 Further Work
Although we have discussed ways of ordering the countermeasures, there
are other ways to take the ordering of the countermeasures even further.
As we have demonstrated that some attacks are much more likely to occur
with regularity than others, it would also be useful to know how many of
those attacks are conducted using the same vulnerabilities. This would
help in being able to recommend the countermeasures which respond
to those vulnerabilities to users first. The problem, as in other areas, is
the lack of resources in this area. In an ideal world, by having access
to details not only of the kind of attack used, but more specific details,
such as the actual way in which systems are compromised, it would be
possible to build a much better profile of how attackers take advantage
of different kinds of threats. Detail of more statistics of successful attack
would be one of the most useful resources to take this work even further.
The idea of using statistics of previous attacks could be taken further by
using Bayesian inference. Bayesian statistics is a way of using more recent
information to revise understanding of the probability of events. It makes
sense to use a statistical method which has been proven to demonstrate
the ability to apply statistics to historical observations and use them to
good effect. The statistics gathered using Bayesian methods could then
be used to order the final priority of results.
Another important area which could be useful would be in seeing how
using alternative valuations could affect the usability of Cloud-COVER.
There may be changes which could be made with regard to the number of
valuations used (more than two types of valuations, or to have an equality
comparison between security attributes), or to have the valuations effect
on the final results as being different. User reaction to these changes
would be an important way to make Cloud-COVER more responsive and
useful to user demands. This would involve analysing the way that users
choose to value their security attributes when presented with more or
fewer valuation levels, and in trying to understand what this means for
the type of valuation used in Cloud-COVER.
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3.10 Discussion
This chapter demonstrated a technique of modelling threat propagation
within a cloud deployment. The important contribution of this chapter is
the way in which the threat propagation is modelled, using an analysis of
permitted operations given to connections, and specific security attributes,
to understand when two connecting instance’s (or rather, specific types of
security defence on those instances) security defences need to be secured
with the same priority. By abstracting away much of the detail (such
as the specific nature of connections or instances) this model could be
easily applied to other distributed systems in order to provide threat
analysis as well. The priority of the threats, and propagating threats, are
determined using the unique method of relative valuations provided by
the user, which are covered in more detail in the previous chapter.
This chapter also presents the way in which the final ordering of results
in Cloud-COVER are determined. The method presented here is one
which allows users to distinguish between valuations which allow threats
to be more equally weighted depending on probability (a more important
than valuation) or one where none of the threats between the two security
attributes can mix (a much more important than valuation).
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4.1 Introduction
Continual assessment is one of the important recommendations for a
good threat modelling process.1 Scandariato notes that the perspective
of threat modelling should be applied depending on the assets being
considered [58]. With every system being unique, this suggests the need
to change perspective for every new threat modelling process, as this
enables people to think about issues which previously have not been
thought about [35]. The fact that threat modelling processes usually take
one of three different perspectives anyway (attacker-centric, software-
centric or asset-centric) demonstrate the fact that even within the various
methods there is no single view of the best way to think about threats to
systems.
By making some of Cloud-COVER’s inputs extensible to users, this
could allow them to make use of the ability to think about threats in
ways that are most relevant to them and their circumstances. Another
important reason to do this is because there are always likely to be threats
which cannot be found within a given representation model. It makes
sense that threats which may make sense when considered from a high-
level perspective would not make sense at a low-level one, and that they
only make sense at the perspective that a user understands them from.
Only by thinking about ideas in different ways can users consider as
1Adam Shostack frequently repeats the mantra ’You are never done threat modelling’
[57]. However he does concede that for organisations needing to ship products, they
have to make a decision on when they are actually done threat modelling.
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many possibilities as possible, if they have the time to do so.
Cloud-COVER’s model is one in which many features of systems
are abstracted away, and the analysis of the model concentrates on the
threat propagation in which three main inputs determine the results
presented to the user. These inputs are the threats to the deployment,
user valuations of security attributes, and connection permissions. By
allowing each of these inputs to be extensible, users can change zero, one
or more of these inputs to shift the perspective of the model in ways that
could allow them to consider things that otherwise they would not be
able to model. For example, the data security attributes which are used
as default include the CIA triad and compliance. However, these are not
the only security attributes which could be used. For example, alternative
security attributes could include authenticity. Allowing users to model
threats using some of these, or even other security attributes they consider
important, can allow for some important distinctions between threats to
be made.
In Cloud-COVER’s results, users are also presented with counter-
measures to threats, and may need some help in distinguishing these
countermeasures from each other. This is partly due to the fact that
administrators are known to apply their own thinking regarding the
amount of effort needed to protect particular machines, which influences
which instances they protect. Heimann and Nochenson find that admin-
istrators generally have tipping points after which they choose not to
protect machines [59]. Cloud-COVER’s intention to be a well rounded
and engineered tool means that at least some effort should be made to
provide users with more knowledge of countermeasures to help their
decision making.
This chapter presents extensibility features to Cloud-COVER, features
which allow users to input their own threats, data security attributes
and connection permissions. These features allow users to shift the
perspective of the tool to one which better suits their own circumstances.
By allowing users to change the model in ways that they may not have
previously considered, Cloud-COVER emphasises the need to re-evaluate
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previously completed threat modelling processes. This encourages an
important feature of a good threat modelling process, of never thinking
that one is finished. Instead users need to continue to think about the
assumptions, considerations and viewpoints when threat modelling their
system. This chapter also includes work on categorising countermeasures,
in order to aid users in understanding which are best suited to their own
circumstances.
This chapter is structured in the following way: we cover the reasons
for allowing security attributes to be changed and examples of these in
Section 4.2, we cover the same points for permissions in Section 4.3, and
again for threats in Section 4.4. The implementation of this extensibility is
discussed in Section 4.5, and the implications are included in Section 4.6.
Related work is in Section 4.7, further work is covered in Section 4.8, and
finally a discussion for the chapter is in Section 4.9.
4.2 Security Attributes
In addition to the more well known CIA security attributes, Cloud-
COVER uses the security attribute of compliance. This was chosen
because of the fact that cloud services may be based anywhere in the
world, and issues such as data location are an important consideration
for a variety of industries, such as defence and healthcare. The fact that
none of the CIA security attributes covered this issue meant that it was
important to include in any representation of cloud services. Figure 4.1
shows an example of valuations which include compliance, with Table 4.1
showing the threats from those valuations. However, compliance can
cover more than a single issue and it is possible to consider splitting
compliance into more than one security goal. A good example of the
usefulness of the ability to add more security attributes to Cloud-COVER
can therefore be demonstrated by splitting up compliance to consider
additional security goals.
In this example, we split compliance up to consider three additional but
separate security attributes. However, depending on one’s perspective,
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Figure 4.1: A figure considering compliance and its propagation, in con-
trast with Figure 4.2 where compliance is considered as three
separate security attributes.
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Figure 4.2: A figure considering compliance split into three additional
security attributes and its propagations. One of the security
attributes, location, does not propagate whilst the others do.
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Priority Threats On Instance Data
1 Threats to compliance C C1
= Threats to compliance C (from A) C1
3 Threats to availability B B1
4 Threats to availability C C1
= Threats to availability C (from A) C1
6 Threats to availability A A1
7 Threats to confidentiality A A1
Table 4.1: The order of threats produced from Figure 4.1
it could be said to include even more. Data location, auditability, and
non-deletion can each be considered to be a part of compliance. Data
location specifically relates to the goal of keeping data within a certain
geographic area or legal jurisdiction. Auditability refers to the ability to
conduct monitoring on all actions performed on data, in order to ensure
that no unacceptable actions take place. Non-deletion refers to the need
for data never to be deleted for as long as it is needed. Each of these
are clearly distinct and important considerations for an organisation to
control.
Given the fact that these security attributes are different to each other,
it makes sense that a user may want to make use of the extensibility
feature to include them in their model. Table 4.3 shows the relevance
of the newly defined data security attributes to the default connection
permissions of Cloud-COVER. This shows how the threat propagations
would occur with the newly included security attributes. When the table
presents the security attribute/permission result as being positive, it
means that the value of that security attribute can propagate. As can be
seen in the table, data location is affected when the permission to move
data is given to the connection. When the analysis is checking to see if
the value propagates in that circumstance, it finds that it can and the
value propagates. However when data location is being considered and
the only connection permission is to create data, then the value does not
propagate, since creating data at the other end of a connection does not
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Priority Threats On Instance Data
1 Threats to auditability C C1
= Threats to auditability C (from A) C1
= Threats to non-deletion C C1
= Threats to non-deletion C (from A) C1
= Threats to location C C1
6 Threats to availability B B1
7 Threats to availability C C1
= Threats to availability C (from A) C1
9 Threats to availability A A1
10 Threats to location A A1
Table 4.2: The order of threats produced from Figure 4.2
affect its location. In Figure 4.2, only two of the three newer security
attributes propagate, based on the values from Table 4.3.
The additional security attributes represented in the model, and the
threats which may be relevant to each of them, would therefore appear
in the results presented to the user. An example of this is can be seen in
Table 4.2, which presents results from Figure 4.2. The fact that additional
results have been found compared to Table 4.1 shows that this approach
could yield useful results for dedicated threat modellers. The fact that
the extra security attributes can be added to the model would mean
that users could use them, or other security attributes, whenever the
circumstances mean that including them would be useful to their threat
modelling.
Any change to the security attributes considered by the model will
also mean that the threats included need to be re-evaluated to see which
security attributes they are able to violate. A security attribute like
compliance which is split into a number of different security attributes
for example, will mean that each additional security attribute will need
to be considered separately. For example, Cloud-COVER needs to be
told whether all existing (or new) threats are relevant to the three new
security attributes in Table 4.3.
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4.3 Permissions
Cloud-COVER’s model considers the permissions given to connections,
which represent the actions that the processes connecting from one
instance are permitted to perform on another instance. The permis-
sions used as default in Cloud-COVER (data creation, destruction and
movement) are operations, and limit the number of threats that can be
considered within the model, as they only represent a minimal set of
permissions which could be controlled. In actual fact, any number of
permissions may be controlled, depending on the connecting processes
and the control that users have over them. The fact that other connection
permissions could be used instead therefore means that this should be
another Cloud-COVER input which should be extended to users, as there
may well be circumstances in which particular permissions will change
the way in which threats propagate.
For example, Cloud-COVER did not include data modification within
its model. This choice was made because it is essentially either data
destruction followed by creation of new data, or a movement of old data
to a new location followed the creation of new data in the location of the
moved data. Either way, the fact that it is a combination of operations
which were already included meant that it was not included. For example,
the CRUD functions considered in databases (Creation, Read, Update,
Delete) are very similar, but consider the update category to be separate
and required [60]. A user may therefore prefer to include this as one of the
connection permissions. Alternatively, they may choose to include other
permissions which are more relevant to their circumstances. Another
alternative is to consider the permissions to read, write and execute. This
can be understood more naturally by users since these permissions are
regularly used to secure user accounts. These roles can also be defined
with regard to data security attributes.
An example of the read, write and execute permissions considered with
regard to security attributes is given in Table 4.4. This again shows how
a users perspective can allow them to change Cloud-COVER’s analysis
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depending on their preferences. Again, the threat propagations would
take place depending on the results found in this table. However, the fact
that the execute permission can be seen to violate all security attributes
demonstrates that in some situations, other actions may be more useful
to consider.
Permissions can include any kind of limitations prescribed on a process.
For example, a process may only be permitted to change things within
a single folder, and not in others. This may prevent the destruction of
particular data that a user considers important. These kinds of modelling
considerations can be of use to users who want to include more details
with regard to the permissions they have configured for their connections.
The only thing that is important is that when considered together with
the included security attributes, a user is able to state whether an attacker
making use of those connections would be able to violate any security
attributes.
4.4 Threats
Cloud-COVER’s threats are an obvious input which a user might wish
to change. Cloud-COVER’s default mode is to consider higher level
threats relevant from a systems perspective, as other threat modelling
tools do not provide this. Additionally, lower level threats are better
considered by threat modelling tools which take in and are therefore
able to understand lower level details of systems. Lower level details
include details such as data flow between threads and processes, and
trust boundaries between these items. Cloud-COVER’s modelled trust
boundaries are between instances, and do not consider data flows within
single instances, meaning that low level threats are more difficult to
reason about. Nevertheless, the fact that Cloud-COVER’s analysis always
operates in the same way, means that users may wish to make use of
changing this input too. Users can provide their own threats to the
system, which they themselves have considered to be more relevant to
Cloud-COVER’s threat propagation.
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Table 4.5: Input to Cloud-COVER about threats
Threat Location Auditability Non-deletion
SQL Injection Modification False False True
4.4.1 Additional Threats
As users can add security attributes, they may also add threats that
they consider the default version of Cloud-COVER to have missed. This
makes sense, as people may either add new threats that may not have
been around or known about when Cloud-COVER’s default threats were
first included. Alternatively, they may consider that a threat which is
listed in Cloud-COVER’s default mode to be two distinct threats, as they
may be able to defend against one without worrying about the effects of
the other threat. These are all valid reasons to do this, and Cloud-COVER
provides an easy structure through which the input file takes threats.
4.4.2 Re-evaluated Threats
When adding alternative security attributes to Cloud-COVER, the exist-
ing threats also need to be re-evaluated with regard to those new security
attributes. We can consider the three alternative security attributes pre-
sented in Section 4.2, data location, auditability and non-deletion. Let
us consider threats from SQL Injection modification, which is a threat
to data because when this threat exists changes to data can be made by
making use of vulnerabilities in the SQL language. This threat would
only be a threat to non-deletion since the data would be deleted upon be-
ing changed. The data location would not change, since the modification
could not change its location. Users must input the data to Cloud-COVER
with the simple representation of the order of security attributes entered,
similar to that of Table 4.5.
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4.5 Implementation
The threats used in Cloud-COVER are taken from two input files. These
files are used for two different but related purposes. The first input file
asks users whether system data or an instance contains certain properties,
which determine whether the threat they are related to exists. The second
input file contains details of the threat itself, such as which security
attributes it violates.
The two files are text files, open to be edited by users, only requiring
adherence to the structure of the inputs (and sufficient security knowl-
edge of the user). This allows users to tailor the tool in a way that suits
their needs.
When analysing the input model, Cloud-COVER first needs to de-
termine whether or not the property required for the threat to exist is
present. This depends on the user entering the properties of the data,
instances and connections. There are also some threats which exist with-
out the need for a property to be present, such as the threats from not
updating software. These threats exist without the need to check for their
properties, and are loaded regardless of user input. For the analysis to
determine that a threat exists, the entries need to be tied by a linking
term (Threat ID, which is in string form), which is the final entry in both
their structures, presented below.
The structure of the threat in the input file is:
Threat Name (String), Probability (Integer: 1 lowest, 3 highest), Propa-
gating Threat (Boolean), Confidentiality Threat (Boolean), Integrity Threat
(Boolean), Availability Threat (Boolean), Compliance Threat (Boolean),
Threat ID (String)
The propagating threat boolean states whether the threat is one which
propagates, whilst the data security attribute properties are used to
specify if it can violate the data security attributes in question. The
threat ID links a threat to the question file, which asks users whether the
property which means the threat exists is present.
The structure of the data or instance question is: Threat property
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question (String), Threat ID (String)
The threat property question only needs to establish the existence of
the threat. For example, for SQL injection attacks, the question asks
whether data is SQL data. A positive answer from the user confirms
that the threat from an SQL injection attack exist, and this threat is then
assigned to that instance. The threat ID must be identical in both input
files for the match to be made by the analyser.
4.6 Implications
In the examples presented in this chapter, only one input at a time
is changed whilst leaving the other inputs in their default states. It
is perfectly acceptable for users to change zero, one or more inputs,
depending on the input that they wish to change.
Each input is an important part of the analysis in Cloud-COVER.
Allowing users to change aspects of the model can be useful in giving
them the freedom to explore threats in ways they may not have thought
much about before. By emphasising particular properties of systems
or data, it is possible to find out more about the security issues of the
systems being modelled.
The extensibility itself has one important caveat, which is that users
must understand the way in which their modified inputs reflects their
own understanding of Cloud-COVER’s model. Providing users with
this extensibility is to give them the trust that they can understand
and use the model correctly for their own purposes. As long as users
understand that if their understanding of security means that the security
attribute/permission table makes sense to them for their own modelled
system, then it makes sense for them to alter the model in that way to
analyse threats.
One criticism which could be made would be to say that users should
not be allowed to extend a model in such a way, as this may end in
incorrect or unsafe advice being presented to them. However, the fact
is that threat modelling does not just exist in the form of automated
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tools, but also as manual processes. People who feel that they have a
sufficient understanding of security issues should be entitled to provide
their own inputs to Cloud-COVER if that is what they wish, since they
might be able to use other threat modelling processes to accomplish the
same results anyway.
Although Cloud-COVER has been adapted for extensibility, the limit
of this extension is the way in which threats propagate. The analysis
of user valuation and threat propagation is unique to Cloud-COVER,
and is one of the reasons it is useful as an alternative to other threat
modelling tools and techniques. By keeping this scope in place, users
have knowledge of how the impact to instances is determined, and how
the threat propagation takes place. Changing the way in which the
propagation takes place has therefore not been considered.
4.7 Related Work
CORAS is a risk management methodology for system stakeholders to
identify security flaws [61]. It has a semi-formal process, coming from
its structured process but one which allows a degree of autonomy with
regard to the perspectives taken to analyse the system. The formality
comes from the use of documentation to ensure good communication
between stakeholders (regarding goals, scope of analysis, and other
issues) and for modelling (which is done using UML to identify security
flaws). The modelling and risk identification stays loyal to a regular
threat modelling approach. In contrast to other approaches however,
CORAS suggests using a workshop of multiple participants to carry out
a step-by-step walk-through, to use their different perspectives to identify
risks in the system. Afterwards, the level of these risks, and whether they
are acceptable or unacceptable is determined, along with the possible
precautions to take. Cloud-COVER allows users to adapt its own model
instead of advocating the use of multiple alternative processes, enabling
users to reuse the same process in order to model an identical system
from different perspectives.
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Don Parker provides alternative security attributes in his so called
’Parkerian Hexad’ [62]. These alternatives include possession, authentic-
ity, and utility in addition to the CIA triad. Possession refers to ownership,
since loss of ownership can bring about concern over the use of data.
Authenticity refers to to veracity of origin, which separates it from in-
tegrity which is mainly concerned with proving that changes have not
occurred. Utility refers to usefulness, since some data cannot be made
use of without other things (such as encrypted data with no decryption
key). Although Cloud-COVER has default security attributes of the CIA
trio along with compliance, users are able to input whatever goals they
have for their data, as long as it makes sense when considered along with
how connection permissions affect threat propagation to other instances
(like in Table 4.3).
4.8 Further Work
Although a part of this chapter looked at the presentation of counter-
measures, they are an important point for any threat modelling process.
Providing a better understanding of countermeasures, their relationships
to one another, and most importantly, their effectiveness, is one of the
most important things users need to be informed about. Sometimes,
countermeasures are shared between threats. Other countermeasures
also make sense to do at the same time as other ones. This is particularly
useful for those which involve educating people within an organisation
on important security matters. It would be useful therefore to explore
ways in which the cost-benefit analysis of countermeasures could be
presented to users, which would enable even better use of their resources.
4.9 Discussion
This chapter has presented extensibility features to Cloud-COVER’s
model, which allows users to input threats, data security attributes and
connection permissions. In addition to making Cloud-COVER much
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more useful by enabling users to shift the perspective of the analysis, this
feature also shows the strength of Cloud-COVER’s underlying model.
The fact that Cloud-COVER is able to reason about threat propagation
using only a few inputs is a demonstration of its well engineered nature.
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5 Case Study
5.1 Introduction
Cloud-COVER was developed to solve specific issues with regard to the
lack of threat modelling tools for systems (apart from SeaSponge). The
previous chapters have outlined the underlying theory of Cloud-COVER,
but it is also important to show that Cloud-COVER is able to provide
useful output.
This chapter presents a case study looking at two users employing
Cloud-COVER, one a security lecturer and another a security novice. For
the security lecturer, a scenario is examined using two different methods
(one being Cloud-COVER), with the major points of comparison between
the two highlighted. For the security novice, the examination concentrates
on usability, another of the original aims of this work. Although this case
study is small in scope, it aims to demonstrate that Cloud-COVER is a
useful vehicle for threat modelling purposes.
5.1.1 Cloud-COVER Usage
A typical session in which Cloud-COVER would require a user to know
about the structure of their cloud deployment (including the connection
permissions) and the data they wish to prioritise. The user would also
need to have knowledge about data security attritubtes, in order to
distinguish between those which they would need to provide preferences
for. Although users do not need to have security knowledge, some
security knowledge could help them to understand how the connection
permissions and attributes would affect how results are gathered for the
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final results, and how they can change their deployment in order to better
protect against threats. After providing the input of the deployment, and
then their preferences for the data security attribtes, Cloud-COVER then
works on its analysis and presents users with the results. Cloud-COVER
allows users to save their progress, so at any point during the input
process, users can save the input and return to it later.
For the security lecturer, this knowledge could be assumed and he was
able to use the tool without asking many questions. The security novice
required a little advice on the mentioned issues before he was able to use
the tool.
This chapter is structured in the following way: we present a case study
comparing the approach of a security lecturer to the results obtained
by Cloud-COVER in Section 5.2, and we present a usability study in
Section 5.3. Possible further work is covered in Section 5.4 and we
provide a discussion of the chapter in Section 5.5.
5.2 Security Lecturer
Frank
Frank is a security lecturer, who has had some experience in online
security. His main experience is in penetration testing and securing
websites, with some recent experience in cloud services and security. The
example scenario presented here is an adaptation of a tool he has been
working with as part of a team.
5.2.1 Frank’s Approach
Frank’s threat modelling approach consists in using a number of tech-
niques, most of which involve utilising experience he has developed from
securing systems he has worked on. There is no one particular process
he uses, but rather he uses a combination of processes until he feels he
has performed a rigorous analysis of the system. This can involve any of
the following:
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• Thinking conceptually about the system and its constituent parts
and identifying the most obvious attack points.
• Extending this analysis to separating out smaller parts of the system
from which launching other attacks could be useful (similar to
threat propagation).
• Visiting security and exploit portals from which he is able to gather
the latest information on threats.
• Using notes taken from previous security reviews, and combining
these with his experience to think about possible attacks and threats.
• Using the above to think about assigning an overall rating of how
secure each instance is (but not in a formal way).
• Attacking the system himself to find any other possible threats.
Frank applies the process to the instances within a deployment, and
considers the connections and possible attacks which they could be used
for. He uses personal security notes from previous systems he has helped
to secure, and considers whether they contain any relevant threats. The
use of security and exploit portals make him feel he is up to date in terms
of his knowledge on threats to security and that he can use this to protect
his system. In terms of threat modelling techniques, he has used manual
threat modelling techniques like STRIDE in the past, but finds them too
cumbersome to use each time for a new analysis.
There is no explicit consideration of security attributes, although he
approaches this issue from the perspective of the purpose of each com-
ponent or instance. Frank’s primary consideration of possible attacks is
in terms of their potential impact. His rating relies upon the degree of
control the attack could exert over an instance, so that those gaining root
access to systems would be the ones likely to have the biggest impact.
This makes sense, and is an alternative to thinking about security in terms
of data security attributes. The issue of probability is also considered,
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but is mostly in the back of his mind, with potential impact being the
main consideration.
The prioritisation of approaching the protection of the system happens
on an ad-hoc basis, by observing the final produced analysis. Frank
works his way through it by prioritising in his own mind what he thinks
the most pressing needs are. He does this by selecting a few of the most
important issues he identifies, and then repeats this process after fixing
the initially identified issues. After having fixed the identified issues, he
then uses automated tools for other things such as penetration testing
to further look into security issues. The process outlined above is one
which fits the general idea of a threat modelling process, although it is
not a formal defined version with a given name.
5.2.2 Scenario
The scenario is an adaptation of a system which Frank was partially
responsible for. The system is a cloud deployment for an advance flood
warning website, which uses 4 cloud instances, as can be seen in Fig-
ure 5.1. Two instances are used as repositories for data (CW and HD
in the figure), which are connected to a third instance (WM). WM is an
instance using powerful computation to model the weather, producing
results for flood warnings. The data for the warning system is forwarded
to WS, which is a website available to the public.
• Instance CW provides regular updates about current weather data.
Important concerns about the data from CW will be integrity and
availability.
• Instance HD operates mainly as a data repository which includes
historical data about the weather for the whole country. Integrity
and availability will be big concerns, but compliance and confiden-
tiality will not.
• Instance WM is a high performance computing service which mod-
els the weather using inputs from both CW and HD to try to under-
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stand what the implications of the weather are likely to be. Each
of the security attributes is important on this instance, although
availability and integrity are the most important.
WM links to HD to request data when needed. CW’s link to WM is
not a request from WM, but rather CW pushing its data over when
it has newer weather data.
• Instance WS is a website presenting the data produced for flood
warnings to the public. The most important aspect of the data on
this instance will be availability, and integrity of data from WM is
also a concern.
WM pushes data to WS to update the flood warning system, with-
out WS requesting the data.
The valuations given for data security attributes are in Figure 5.2.
HD1
WM1 WS1
CW1
Create
Data Instance
Key:
Weather model
Current weather
Historical data
Website
Connection &
permissions
Create
Create
Move
Figure 5.1: The model for the case study scenario. The scenario involves 4
instances, passing data between each other in order to produce
a website for a flood warning system.
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5.2.3 Cloud-COVER
Frank’s input to Cloud-COVER took about 10 minutes, some time of
which was spent considering the preference values for the data security
attributes. The input of the deployment did not present any problems,
with Frank working through the entry with relative ease.
Frank worked his way through the input stages, first entering informa-
tion on the instances and their properties and then going through the
connections and data. The longest time he spend was when considering
the data security attributes and his preferences for them. With this input
Cloud-COVER was able to produce the final list, with the top results
visible in Table 5.1.
When entering details about the deployment, Frank did not like how
threat modelling was not able to consider alternatives at the same time.
For example, the current weather instance could be much more easily
replaced than the instance storing historical data if necessary to do so.
However, it did not mean that the availability of information was any less
important. Although the human mind is easily able to comprehend this
information, it was not obvious how this could be included in the model.
The results were presented in a way that Frank found easy to under-
stand (as can be seen in Table 5.1), with the explicit prioritisation very
clearly seen in the presentation. The highest priority was given to the
threats emanating from instances CW and HD. Also the organisational
threats were presented separately from the instance threats, which Frank
was not used to. This is something which sets Cloud-COVER apart from
other threat modelling tools. In terms of the results, the presented results
make sense and look reasonable when compared to Frank’s security at-
tribute valuations. A screenshots of the top results can be seen in Figure
1 in the Appendix.
5.2.4 Frank’s Approach
Frank’s analysis works using a different perspective to Cloud-COVER,
in which he essentially thinks about the most likely attacks to a system.
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Attacks and groups of similar attacks are similar to what Cloud-COVER
thinks of as threats. For example, an SQL injection attack is a threat to
SQL and its data, and can be performed in many ways. Frank would list
SQL attack as one type of attack on that instance, and then consider other
attack types he has knowledge of. In order to provide a comparison,
these attacks have been grouped together as threats when presenting the
results of his analysis in Table 5.2, although it is perfectly reasonable to
highlight that there are differences between the two perspectives despite
the similarities.
Frank’s analysis took around 90 minutes, time during which he was
using internet resources and his own notes to identify possible threats.
Also Frank was clear that the initial analysis is unlikely to be the final one,
as additional analysis is a frequent issue with threat modelling. Input to
Cloud-COVER took around 10 minutes, a significant time saving. Any
additional analysis needed from changes made to the system could also
provide a significant time saving.
Frank concentrated on the three data hosting and producing instances,
leaving the website to be the least most important in his consideration.
The table shows that the threats he considers to be a priority are simi-
lar to the ones listed in Cloud-COVER, apart from his desire to check
the software on the instances to make sure that they are not making
the system unsafe. Cloud-COVER does not check individual items of
software, but asks whether out of date software exists on the system.
Although Cloud-COVER does consider this issue, Frank is more intent
on specifically checking this issue himself by looking at individual appli-
cations. However, Frank was made aware that for users who wish to do
so, the extensibility feature would allow him to enter individual items of
software to Cloud-COVER as threats if he wanted to do so.
In terms of threats identified, one attack type which was not listed in
Frank’s analysis is the virtualisation environment breach. Although the
probability of this threat is low, the past couple of years have actually
started seeing increasing virtualisation platform patches being applied.
This is because this type of threat seems to be becoming more real, and
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Threat To Data On Frank’s Priority
Denial of service CW Yes
Communications attacks CW No
Software or OS out of date CW Yes
Unautharised user attacks CW No
Denial of service HD Yes
SQL injection attacks HD Yes
Communications attacks HD No
Software or OS out of date HD Yes
Unautharised user attacks HD No
Insecure APIs WM No
Denial of service WM No
SQL injection attacks WM No
Software or OS out of date WM No
Table 5.2: The top threats found using Frank’s method.
the timing of these patches have caused some problems for cloud users
[63] [64]. This demonstrates that Frank’s personal experience was not
able to compensate for this, although at the same time the types of
attacks he identified covered almost all of the same ones identified by
Cloud-COVER.
Finally, Frank’s analysis does not perform an explicit consideration of
security attributes with regard to the connections and the possible range
of attacks this either enables or disables. The fact that Frank acknowl-
edges that each instance’s outgoing connections have to be judged based
on the possibilities opened up by the connections means that there is an
awareness of threat propagation. But by dealing with them as they come
around, the comparison between the Cloud-COVER analysis and Frank’s
analysis is difficult to evaluate.
5.2.5 Cloud-COVER Advantages
As a person with security knowledge, Frank produced a security analysis
which covered a large amount of the threats identified by Cloud-COVER.
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There were some factors however which demonstrate the value of Cloud-
COVER when compared with his manual threat modelling results.
Time Frank’s analysis took around 90 minutes, which was much longer
than the 10 minutes it took for the whole process of inputting the
deployment and getting the results from Cloud-COVER. Frank
was very impressed with how quickly an analysis was able to be
produced on Cloud-COVER.
With regard to the presented countermeasures, both methods leave
users much work to do in terms of finding out how to take action
against those threats. Although Cloud-COVER presents counter-
measures to users, users still need to do research of their own to
find out details regarding implementation on their own individual
systems.
Cloud-COVER Perspective Cloud-COVER provides an alternative vantage
point from which to judge threats to systems, and with the extensi-
bility feature even allow users to change the model’s perspective.
Frank’s method of finding specific kinds of attacks and working to
protect them does not mean that he will have identified other simi-
lar attacks which may need different defences. At least these can
all be grouped together under a single heading in Cloud-COVER,
while it is plausible that Frank could miss important examples of
attacks with his methods.
Also, Frank did not classify organisational threats separately in
his analysis, but was aware of the differences in his own mind.
Some of the organisational threats are definitely not ones which
would necessarily be considered threats in non cloud systems, so
are important to inform users about. For example, data loss is an
easy problem to solve in a regular computer, as one can retrieve
the physical hardware. Since this is not possible in the cloud,
it is important that any cloud specific issues are not forgotten
about, since many users (especially cloud newcomers) who may be
94
5.2 Security Lecturer
unfamiliar with them.
Threat Knowledge Frank was not aware of a couple of listed threats
among the organisational threats presented: cloud provider non-
deletion and economic denial of service attack (EDoS). Although
the EDoS attack is still a low probability one, it would still be a good
idea to implement protections for it. Frank was more concerned
about what non-deletion of data could mean for information meant
to be confidential.
This suggests that even for people who consider themselves to be up
to date, the area of security is one which moves forward so quickly
that even knowledgeable people can miss important information.
Explicit prioritisation Frank’s method meant identifying threats and then
working through them in a methodical way. Cloud-COVER identi-
fied the same threats and presented them with an initial priority
attached. Frank observed that although he did not disagree with
any of the highest priority threats presented (in terms of his own
priorities), he would still be likely to go through any threats pre-
sented with his own method (of picking the most important, fixing
them, then returning to see what remained).
However Frank also stated that one of the useful points of this
feature would be to present the results to a superior in the work-
place, without needing to justify that the results were influenced
largely by the desire for more resources to protect with (although
the user could still manipulate the results, in theory).1 This could
be done, for example, by using Cloud-COVER in front of the person
(and agreeing about the given input ratings) and demonstrating the
importance of those security issues.
1The issue of workplace superiors rarely giving enough resources to with which to
secure systems with is a frequent complaint in the security section of The Register. Trevor
Pott, a contributor who regularly discusses his experiences as a system administrator,
states that he was never given the correct resources to do his job in his 20 years in such
roles [65].
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5.2.6 Cloud-COVER Disadvantages
Frank produced a detailed analysis of threats, and some of this analysis
was done using methods which are not available through the medium of
a threat modelling tool.
Human nuances The fact that Cloud-COVER was not able to consider
alternatives at the same time was described earlier.
Even if Cloud-COVER included the possibility of including alterna-
tives, it is just as likely that other equally difficult concepts (easy for
humans, difficult for models) exist. In other words, it is important
to acknowledge that the importance of knowledge and experience
in security cannot simply be made redundant by a threat modelling
tool.
Threat consideration Although Cloud-COVER does ask users about whether
they include software which is not regularly updated on each in-
stance, Frank’s approach is one in which he personally chooses to
check this for himself, and thought that Cloud-COVER’s question-
ing may be a bit lacking in this regard. Frank’s approach makes
sense, but at the same time could be included in Cloud-COVER by
making use of the extensibility feature.
This question is about how much detail Cloud-COVER asks of
its users, and there is a case to make that a bit more detail could
make for a more useful set of results. This will not be a problem
for Cloud-COVER’s model to cope with, and is something which
makes sense to consider. The problem is that software which is
insecure today, becomes secure tomorrow through features such
as software updates. It is a difficult balancing act, but one which
could be countered by, for example, constantly updating Cloud-
COVER’s default list of inputs. But the question of just how much
information users are asked about is still an important one, and is
one of the main areas that could be worth exploring for the future.
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5.2.7 Not Reviewed
Extensibility Although the extensibility feature was not used in this case,
it was demonstrated to Frank to see his reaction to it. Frank ap-
preciated the value of the feature, especially as someone with an
interest in exploits and a slightly different perspective to the one
Cloud-COVER uses.
Complexity Using a scenario involving 4 instances, with 3 connections
between those instances, still took Frank much longer to consider
using his own process than it took Cloud-COVER. The reality is
that given a larger deployment, with even more connections (and
instances with any more than one outgoing connection), threat
analysis will take much longer (for both methods).
Frank agreed that given a scenario involving any additional things
to consider, it would take a huge amount of thinking and work in
order to properly identify threats to each part of the system.
5.2.8 Case Study Thoughts
Frank’s approach to threat modelling is similar in process to what one
would expect. The problem for Frank is that he does not have a structured
approach to threat modelling, and instead has a rather ad-hoc approach.
Although a lot of people would use a regular structured approach, such
as a specific process, there are also many who, like Frank, would not.
Whether using a structure approach or not however, in manual processes
there is always the possibility of people missing threats. Even single
threats are important to cover, and there were a few examples of threats
not being covered by Frank’s analysis, even if a couple of them are
considered to be low probability threats.
If we also consider perfect analysis which does not miss any threats
and produces all the threats that Cloud-COVER also does, Cloud-COVER
can still be of use. Cloud-COVER’s extensibility should allow for parts of
almost any process to be automated, but it would require users taking
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the time to work on the inputs. Once finished however, it should still be
able to produce useful results. It would also allow for people to think
about how else they would be able to identify threats by making use of
this feature.
The most obvious advantage that Cloud-COVER can provide to anyone,
even the best threat modelling experts, would be to save them time. Frank
was extremely impressed by this aspect of Cloud-COVER, especially since
the extensibility feature could allow him to adapt it to something closer
to his own perspective of security. The fact that he had some different
ideas with regard to Cloud-COVER meant that he thought this could be
a very useful tool. The other useful aspects of the time saving would
be money saving for businesses and individuals. Also, the ability to
quickly use it to demonstrate the security needs of a deployment to any
workplace superiors being hesitant about providing money for security.
5.3 Usability Study
5.3.1 Cloud User
Gabriel is a researcher who has been using cloud computing for several
years. His experience is mainly in cloud portability, and he has used
a variety of cloud platforms and services. He has little knowledge of
security, but occasionally needs to use security features (such as single
sign on).
Gabriel was taken through the use of Cloud-COVER, and some basic
security issues were explained in order for him to understand how to use
the tool. This comprised of the following steps:
• Basic security knowledge. The idea of a beachhead in attacking a
distributed system was explained, and why deployments can be
defended more effectively by analysing them to find where threats
exist. Also the idea of data security attributes, why they make a
difference, and the need to provide values for them later.
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• The way to enter instances, data, and connections in order to input
the deployment.
• The way to provide preferences between the data security attributes
for the final rankings.
• The way to understand the presentation of the results.
Before using the tool, Gabriel was very inquisitive and asked several de-
tails about how it worked. He entered the details of his deployment, then
looked at the presented results. Since Gabriel knows so little about secu-
rity, there was no other threat modelling analysis that Cloud-COVER’s
results could be compared to. Instead, his overall thoughts as a security
novice and use of Cloud-COVER are covered below.
5.3.2 Positives
• Gabriel did not know about data security attributes before, but
commented on how he appreciated how and why they would be
valuable to differentiate between the kinds of threats faced on the
cloud. This suggests that these concepts can be easily explained to
people with minimal security knowledge, and is something which
can be easily included in a Cloud-COVER use guide.
• Gabriel found input to be very easy, something he found surprising.
As a security novice, he expected to have some difficulty with
entering system information and the language used when doing
so. He expressed the thought that he might need guidance during
initial use (and was especially wary of coming across technical
terms), but seemed to find entry self explanatory.
• Gabriel found the results presentation to be clear. He also liked the
presentation of the countermeasures and the fact that he could nav-
igate between them by their categorisation. This was an important
issue to him as a security novice.
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• Gabriel expressed a preference for the relative preference valuations
when asked if he would prefer numeric valuations instead.
5.3.3 Negatives
• Gabriel did not like some of the data and instance property descrip-
tions, due to the mix of using both positive and negative statements
to confirm the existence of threats. Although positive confirmations
made more sense to him (such as "Data is SQL data"), he did not
like the negative confirmations (for example, "Instance data is not
regularly backed up"), which he found a bit confusing.
This issue was one which was considered during design, and ul-
timately left in due to the way the extensibility feature works. By
linking the confirmation of a property (such as data being SQL
data) with the existence of a threat (such as SQL injection attacks),
users can easily add security threats to Cloud-COVER’s analysis.
Changing the method of extensibility would make it more difficult
to use. For this reason, although the issue is a valid one to raise, it
is not something which was changed.
• Gabriel felt that connection permissions could have been better
explained on screen. This is an example of how the less knowl-
edgeable users need to be considered more in terms of the user
interface.
• Gabriel felt that the input could be improved, by allowing for in-
stances with identical properties to simply be cloned and renamed,
without needing to repeat the input process. This is an interest-
ing feature which would be a useful addition to Cloud-COVER’s
usability.
5.3.4 Neutral
• Gabriel did not need any of the features of extensibility, and ex-
pressed satisfaction as long as predefined threats were loaded by
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the tool.
• Although he seemed to understand how the probabilities affected
the rankings, he did not use both valuation types because he was
unsure about how getting very different rankings resulting from
their use would mean for protecting the deployment overall. The ad-
vantages of using the different valuations may need to be explained
in more detail to Cloud-COVER users.
5.3.5 Usability Study Thoughts
Although Gabriel expressed some issues with the tool, most of the con-
cerns had either already been considered, or were smaller user interface
issues which can be dealt with during possible further development. This
suggests that the user interface has some issues which could be made
better. In terms of analysis and results, Gabriel seemed to find the tool
easy to use, and understood the way the results were presented.
One of the original aims of Cloud-COVER’s development was to be able
to provide a usable threat modelling tool for security novices. Although
Gabriel is a single user and not a representative sample of novice users,
his ability to easily input his system and understand the presented results
suggests that the original aims have largely been addressed.
5.4 Further Work
Given more time, it would have been useful to have produced a bigger
case study, demonstrating the way in which Cloud-COVER could aid
users of larger deployments than the one presented. This could have
demonstrated the amount of time and effort Cloud-COVER could save,
and threats which could easily have been missed in such a complex
analysis. Cloud-COVER’s scalability has been tested on deployments
with values for 10, 20, 30, 40, and 50 data items, with the processing and
output time found to increase linearly. However, it would be a good
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idea to test this with increasingly larger scenarios. In addition, Cloud-
COVER’s extensibility features, allowing for users to shift the perspective
of the threat modelling process, would also be very important to include
in any extensive case study.
Also, a single user is not a representative enough sample to prove that
the tool’s usability is good enough. It would be helpful to test Cloud-
COVER’s usability on a larger number of people. One interesting angle
would be to see how cloud computing novices (not just security novices)
would find it. Although the examples presented in this case study are
useful, it is also clear that there are other features of Cloud-COVER which
would be worthwhile to highlight in a larger case study.
5.5 Discussion
This case study has presented some important findings. Although people
with security knowledge can produce a very thorough analysis, and find
the vast majority of threats that Cloud-COVER comes up with, there
are still small examples which might slip through. However, it has also
demonstrated factors such as how human thought will always be an
important part of a process such as threat modelling, with the issue of
human nuances coming up. This shows how human factors can never
be ignored in important issues like security. Given that there was not a
massive difference in terms of the amount of threats found by the two
approaches, one of the most important findings was the vast difference
in time in order to produce the results for both, with 80 minutes saved
when using Cloud-COVER, and without the need to consult additional
resources.
The real positive point for Cloud-COVER is when considering more
complexity, Cloud-COVER would be able to perform the same role but
for a much larger scenario. A larger scenario would require a much more
complicated analysis to figure out the connections and the way in which
they should affect the way that defences should be prioritised across
any deployment. The other major benefit is that security novices would
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also be able to use Cloud-COVER to produce a similar threat modelling
analysis as people with a good level of knowledge on security.
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6 Conclusions
6.1 Introduction
This thesis presents Cloud-COVER and its underlying model and threat
propagation analysis. Cloud-COVER is a threat modelling tool for cloud
computing, which presents users with threats to their cloud deployments,
threats identified by analysing the input of their deployment. By applying
the threat modelling process at a higher level than the low-levels that it
has traditionally been used for, Cloud-COVER is able to cover an area
that other tools have not.
Cloud-COVER has a default model which analyses the way threats
propagate depending on their relevance, and ability to propagate, based
on three things: threats, user valuations of data security attributes, and
connection permissions. However, Cloud-COVER has been modelled in
such a way that any of those three inputs can be adapted by the user.
The model has been abstracted in a way that the analysis always takes
place in the same way, but the inputs can let users change the perspective
of the analysis, allowing for a more useful threat modelling process.
There is the possibility of taking the work presented in this thesis
further, some of which we have covered in the penultimate sections of
each chapter. However, the lack of other methods which allow users
to determine threats to systems using the methods presented here, of
analysing threat propagation, and of using relative valuations, suggests
that Cloud-COVER should be immediately useful for anybody looking
for a tool capable of providing such a service.
Each section below provides an overview of the contributions made in
each of the chapters presented in this thesis.
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6.2 Cloud-COVER
Chapter 2 introduces two important parts in the design of Cloud-COVER,
the model used to represent the cloud deployments and the user supplied
valuations of data security attributes.
The chapter presents the underlying model of Cloud-COVER and how
it is used to represent user’s deployments. It is an important part of
how threat propagation analysis takes place, and also features promi-
nently when discussing Cloud-COVER’s extensibility and adaptability in
Chapter 4.
This chapter also presents the way in which Cloud-COVER takes input
from users based on their relative preferences between data security at-
tributes. By using this alternative valuation system instead of numerical
valuations, Cloud-COVER is better able to justify the ordering of the pre-
sented threats, in contrast to some of the more ambiguous interpretations
which result when using a numerical system. This is a unique and novel
way in which to rate threats to a system, and solves some of the problems
known to exist when using numerical valuations.
6.3 Threat Propagation
Chapter 3 presents the way in which Cloud-COVER analyses threat
propagation, and builds on the idea of the input values from Chapter 2.
Using the user valuations, and depending on connection permissions
and the security attributes being considered, Cloud-COVER determines
whether certain kinds of threats exist over the links connecting instances.
If they do represent a threat, the priority given to the propagating threat
is taken from the user supplied valuations. This allows a consistent
priority to be given to the threats when the results are presented to the
users.
The way in which threat propagation is analysed is unique to Cloud-
COVER, with its consideration of the combination of connection permis-
sions and data security attributes. By looking at these issues from a high
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level perspective, this analysis is able to provide a useful viewpoint from
which to understand threat propagation in cloud computing.
6.4 Providing Extensibility to Cloud-COVER
Chapter 4 considers another important part of the threat modelling
process, of considering threats from alternative perspectives. Although
Cloud-COVER’s default operation is one we are satisfied provides users
with worthwhile information about threats to their system, there are
additional changes which could make it even more useful. The constant
need to re-evaluate threats to systems, and from different perspectives,
is an important part of a good threat modelling process. Allowing
extensibility of system inputs to the user can allow for this to take place.
This is done by allowing the three inputs of threats, permissions, and
data security attributes to be changed by the user. The chapter presents
specific examples in which additional threats could be found depending
on the inputs which are changed. The way in which different perspectives
can mean additional, or reduced numbers of threats, depending on what
is being considered, suggests not only the usefulness of this feature, but
also the well engineered nature of Cloud-COVER and its underlying
model.
6.5 Case Study
Chapter 5 presents a case study featuring a security lecturer and a security
novice. For the security lecturer, the chapter compares the results of the
tool and the results from the lecturer’s own threat modelling process,
and highlights the advantages and disadvantages of Cloud-COVER. For
the security novice, Cloud-COVER’s usability is covered.
This case study demonstrates that the main goals envisioned when
originally developing the tool, of helping to identify the important threats
to cloud deployments, and of being accessible to people with little security
knowledge, has been achieved.
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6.6 Final Thoughts
This thesis has presented research making significant contributions to the
area of computer security, and in particular, threat modelling. Although
threat modelling processes and tools are useful, they are not widely used,
do not offer much help to those looking to protect systems, and have not
been applied to cloud computing. By taking the general idea of threat
modelling, adapting it to cloud computing, and subjecting it to academic
rigour, we have developed and presented the underlying theories and
model of Cloud-COVER. Cloud-COVER is a threat modelling tool for
cloud computing developed to aid the identification of threats to cloud
deployments.
By developing a structured and extensible tool, we have strengthened
the theory behind threat modelling whilst keeping to the original threat
modelling process. We have also developed novel ways of solving specific
issues relating to the valuation of threats in such processes, by allowing
users to value data security attributes using relative preferences. In
addition, Cloud-COVER has been intended to be easy to use for those
less knowledgeable on security matters. By aiming the tool at users
including security novices, it is hoped that security knowledge can be
made accessible to more people, which can hopefully help in reducing
some of the anxiety many people have of using cloud computing.
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Figure 1: A screenshot of the results for the case study.
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